Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy
Volume 7 | Issue 2

7-1-2017

The Internationalization of Climate Damages
Litigation
Michael Byers
Kelsey Franks
Andrew Gage

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Michael Byers, Kelsey Franks & Andrew Gage, The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation, 7 Wash. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y
264 (2017).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact cnyberg@uw.edu.

Byers et al.: The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation

Copyright © 2017 by Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CLIMATE
DAMAGES LITIGATION
Michael Byers*, Kelsey Franks & Andrew Gage
ABSTRACT: The annual global costs of climate change in 2010 were
estimated at nearly $700 billion. As the costs continue to escalate, discussion is
necessarily shifting to who should pay for mitigation and adaption. Many
scholars argue that policy considerations and principles of tort law support
holding greenhouse gas producers responsible for the costs of climate change.
However, legal claims against greenhouse gas producers in the United States
have thus far proven unsuccessful. This Article explores two previously
overlooked potentialities that could significantly and rapidly alter the landscape
for climate change litigation: (1) the emergence of transnational climate change
litigation coupled with the possible enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S.
courts; and (2) the enactment of legislation altering the rules around climate
change liability. This Article then quantifies the contribution of major U.S. fossil
fuel companies to the costs and damages of climate change to illustrate the
potential financial impacts of successful litigation or legislative change.
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INTRODUCTION

In a speech given on September 29, 2015 at Lloyd’s of
London, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney described
climate change as a “Tragedy of the Horizon” that is bound to
become a “defining issue for [global] financial stability.”1 He
described broad channels through which climate change will
impact financial stability in the coming decades, two of which
are worth repeating in full:
First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance
liabilities and the value of financial assets that arise
from climate—and weather-related events, such as
floods and storms that damage property or disrupt
trade;

1. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, Speech Given at Lloyd’s of
London: Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon—Climate Change and Financial
Stability
at
4
(Sept.
29,
2015),
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech844.pdf.
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Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise
tomorrow if parties who have suffered loss or damage
from the effects of climate change seek compensation
from those they hold responsible. Such claims could
come decades in the future, but have the potential to hit
carbon extractors and emitters—and, if they have
liability cover, their insurers—the hardest.2
The physical risks of climate change are well understood.3 In
2010, the global costs of climate change, including private and
public property damage, were estimated at nearly $700 billion.
That number is projected to rise dramatically in the coming
years.4 The United States incurred an estimated $45 billion of
that nearly $700 billion,5 and is expected to incur hundreds of
billions more in climate change-related damages by the end of
the century.6
With over 95 percent of peer-reviewed scientific papers that
take a position on anthropogenic global warming endorsing the
view that human activity is causing climate change,7 the
2. Id. at 5–6.
3. Numerous articles, reports, and studies have summarized the harm to people,
property, and the natural environment caused by climate change. See, e.g., CLIMATE
VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR: A GUIDE TO THE
COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT PLANET (2d ed. 2012); Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming:
The Ultimate Public Nuisance, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 107, 113–19 (Clifford Rechtschaffen ed., 2007); Gary
C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions
Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 268 (2004) (explaining that the consequences of
global warming include heat waves, droughts, storms, harm to biodiversity and
agriculture, stimulation of infectious diseases, and rises in sea levels).
4. See CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 17.
5. See id. at 48.
6. See id. (estimating the cost of climate change-related damage in the United States
will exceed $100 billion annually by 2030); Michael Greenstone, Paying the Cost of
Climate Change, BROOKINGS (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/09/19-paying-cost-of-climatechange-greenstone (citing http://riskybusiness.org/report/national).
7. See John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global
Warming in the Scientific Literature, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 8 (May 15, 2013),
http://stacks.iop.org/ERL/8/. The most respected of these peer-reviewed scientific
papers are the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, produced and
reviewed by thousands of scientists from the UN’s 195 member states. See
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS
REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2014) (“[a]nthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and
population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented
in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other
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discussion is shifting to the second channel identified by
Carney and the focus of this Article: the liability risks
presented by climate litigation. The question of who should pay
for the costs and damages of climate change will only become
more salient as public awareness of the costs increase, and the
science connecting greenhouse gases with specific climate
events improves.8
Some scholars have argued that policy considerations and
the principles of tort law support holding greenhouse gas
producers responsible for the costs of climate change.9 In the
anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are
extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the
mid-20th century.”). According to a study conducted in 2004, of 928 article abstracts
listed in the Institute of Scientific Information database, 75 percent of the papers
either explicitly or implicitly accepted the consensus view of the IPCC Reports, and 25
percent took no position on the current anthropogenic climate change. Notably, none of
the papers opposed the consensus view. See Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower:
The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004).
8. Recent efforts to use legal channels to hold fossil fuel companies accountable for
climate costs have included public campaigns. See, e.g., Climate Suit against RWE:
Peruvian Mountain Guide Will Appeal, GERMANWATCH (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://germanwatch.org/en/13438 (demonstrating their support for Peruvian farmer
Saul Luciano Lliuya in litigation against the German coal company, RWE, with
extensive media and other public outreach). See also WEST COAST ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, CLIMATE LAW IN OUR HANDS, http://www.climatelawinourhands.org (note that
author Andrew Gage is involved in this campaign); Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to
Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE 1, 4 (2007) (“[W]e should start
thinking about cost allocation now because very soon the world is going to start doing
so. As the realization sinks in that climate change will cause billions of dollars of harm
even if we do everything feasible to cut back on emissions, the people who are directly
harmed are going to start wondering whether they alone should bear the costs.”).
9. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8 at 29–33 (“In addition to just deserts, ‘Emitters Pay’
could serve other social goals. As discussed earlier, the prospect of financial
responsibility could serve as a valuable incentive for reducing emissions. . . . Finally,
emitters may be in a good position to spread costs to shareholders or consumers, thus
serving the loss-spreading function.”); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-SoRadical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–5
(2003); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance
and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1861–63 (2008); Eduardo M. Penalver,
Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change,
38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 591 (1998) (“The cost-reducing goal of tort law indicates
that courts should seek to hold liable those parties who are in the best position to
make the price of products that lead to global climate change reflect their true cost
(that is, to include the costs of accidents produced by global climate change within the
prices of products whose manufacture and use contributes to the problem of climate
change). The second, justice-based, goal of tort law indicates that the parties held
liable should be those who have negligently failed to address the threat of climate
change and who have taken actions to prevent other people from dealing appropriately
with this threat. Given these goals, it is justifiable to hold liable the companies located
at the earliest stages in the process of producing and marketing the fossil fuels
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absence of a comprehensive international or domestic
regulatory scheme, using litigation to recover such costs has
become increasingly appealing.
In the United States alone, over 500 cases have raised
climate change issues in state and federal courts.10 However,
only a handful of these cases have involved a plaintiff suing a
non-governmental defendant for damages caused by climate
change. These notably include Connecticut v. American Electric
Company,11 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,12 and Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation. 13
While these ‘climate damages’ claims have been
unsuccessful thus far,14 it is not unusual for new types of
litigation to encounter problems as procedural obstacles are
navigated and legal theories are tested.15 This has prompted
numerous scholars to analyze the potential for climate
damages litigation—most often at the domestic level and on
the basis of current legal frameworks related to liability. 16
This Article discusses two previously overlooked
potentialities that could change the climate damages litigation
landscape significantly and rapidly: specifically, the emergence

resulting in greenhouse gas emissions.”).
10. See Climate Change Litigation in the U.S.,
http://www.climatecasechart.com (last visited June 24, 2016).

ARNOLD

&

PORTER,

11. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), partially rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), partially rev’d, 564 U.S. 410, 415
(2011).
12. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), partially rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g en
banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
13. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
14. See, e.g., American Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. at 274, vacated, 582 F.3d 309
(U.S. App. 2009), rev’d in part, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011); Comer, 2007 WL at *1, rev’d
in part, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208
(5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Native
Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp., aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
15. See J. Randolph Evans et al., Past Prologue to Climate Change Liability, LAW360
(May 31, 2011),
http://www.dentons.com/en/~/media/d967a09488eb4fc69037f35c193007cd.ashx.
16. Evans, supra note 15; see, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory
E. Wannier, United States of America, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2012) (examining the potential for climate
damages litigation in 18 countries). See also articles by Grossman, Zasloff, and
Penalver, supra note 9.
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of transnational climate damages litigation, including the
possible enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts; and
the enactment of legislation altering the rules around climate
damages liability or “climate compensation acts.” These
potentialities could occur individually or together.
Section II of this Article provides an overview of the current
state of climate damages litigation in the United States,
drawing on jurisprudence and doctrine to outline the threshold
issues currently facing potential domestic plaintiffs seeking to
have their claim heard in U.S. courts. In addition, it describes
the causation challenges that would likely emerge should a
claim be considered on the merits.17
Section III then introduces the first potentiality that could
change the current climate damages litigation landscape
significantly: the emergence of transnational litigation
involving foreign plaintiffs bringing a claim against nongovernment U.S. defendants—notably, U.S. greenhouse gas
producers—in U.S. or foreign courts, and then seeking to have
the resulting judgments enforced in countries where the
defendants have assets.18
The climate damages litigation landscape would also be
significantly altered if countries enact legislation changing or
clarifying the rules around climate damages liability. Section
IV considers this possibility, drawing on the lessons learned
from tobacco compensation acts to show how governments
might be prompted to alter the rules around liability in
response to new developments or situations of perceived
unfairness.19
Based on research quantifying the respective contribution of
investor-owned greenhouse gas producers to carbon emissions,
Section V calculates the respective contribution of major U.S.
fossil fuel companies (as examples of major greenhouse gas
producers) to the costs and damages of climate change. These
calculations suggest the significant financial impact that the
two previously identified potentialities could have if one or
both become legal realities.20

17. See infra Section II, “State of Climate Damages Litigation in the United States.”
18. See infra Section III, “Transnational Climate Damages Litigation.”
19. See infra Section IV, “Climate Compensation Legislation.”
20. See infra Section V, “Quantifying the Liability Risk of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Producers.”
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STATE OF CLIMATE DAMAGES LITIGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES

Broadly speaking, climate litigation refers to “any litigation
motivated by a concern about climate change or climate change
policy,” although narrower definitions are sometimes
proposed.21 The term can encompass a wide range of litigation
involving a variety of: actors, including governmental and nongovernmental plaintiffs and defendants; types of claims,
including those based on statutory, common, and public
international law; and purposes, including forcing, prohibiting,
and recovering for governmental and non-governmental action
or inaction on climate change.22
This Article uses the expression ‘climate damages’ litigation
to refer to a specific subset of climate litigation, namely, claims
involving a plaintiff suing one or more non-governmental
defendants for damages caused by climate change (such as
those arising from a rise in sea level, and the exacerbation of
climate events including hurricanes) and the costs of preparing
for such impacts. The nature of this subset of climate litigation
makes torts based on negligence, nuisance, and conspiracy well
suited as potential bases for liability.23
Academic articles on the prospects of climate damages
litigation generally sit along a spectrum between two opposing
positions. At one end of the spectrum, commentators who are
optimistic about the prospects for climate damages litigation
argue that climate damages are not fundamentally different
from other types of common law damages that already give
rise to liability,24 and that climate damages claims are very
21. David Markell & J. B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the
Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 26 (2012). The
authors adopt a narrow definition for the purposes of their review: “any piece of
federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or judicial litigation in which the party
filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact or law
regarding the substance or policy of climate change causes and impacts.” Id. at 27.
22. See Markell, supra note 21, at 30–38 (discussing generally the major types of
climate litigation); ARNOLD & PORTER, supra note 10 (a table of current U.S. climate
litigation, maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and the law firm
Arnold & Porter LLP).
23. See ARNOLD & PORTER, supra note 10 (a table of current U.S. climate litigation,
which includes the ‘principle law’ used and core object of cases). The climate damages
claims filed to date in the United States have been centered on these bases for
liability.
24. Such articles discuss how torts of nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy could be
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much in keeping with the purposes of tort law.25
Many commentators sit mid-way along the spectrum. While
they accept that existing legal concepts could form a basis to
recover climate damages, they caution that such cases face a
series of challenges often centered around causation—
specifically, which defendants can legitimately be said to have
“caused” climate damages.26 Articles in this range of the
spectrum typically accept the possibility of climate damages
litigation, but vary on the likelihood of success.27
At the other end of the spectrum, some commentators argue
that climate damages claims face threshold issues that will
likely prevent them from ever being argued on their merits. 28
In essence, these articles suggest that although climate change
is affecting existing legal rights protected through tort law,
climate damages claims raise issues that are too complicated

applied to climate damages claims, and respond to the many defenses that are likely to
be raised in such litigation. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9 at 60–61 (assessing the
various tort principles that could provide a basis for claims against GHG producers,
such as product liability and public nuisances, and concluding that “some tort-based
climate change suits have strong legal merits and may be capable of succeeding”).
25. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing how shifting the costs and
damages of climate change onto fossil fuel producers is in line with the principle of
corrective justice and equality); Zasloff, supra note 9 (discussing the various
theoretical bases for tort litigation, and the policy reasons for targeting ‘upstream’
greenhouse gas producers); Penalver, supra note 9.
26. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation
Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COL. L. REV. 701, 703 (2008).
27. See, e.g., David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of
Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. ST. L. Rev. 1742, 1794 (2007) (arguing
that changes in our understanding of climate change are increasingly the “foreseeable
costs of GHG emissions,” thereby shifting the “relative risk-utility balance of climate
changing activities,” thus increasing the likelihood a court will find that a GHG
producers’ activities present an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury); Evans, supra
note 15 at 3 (arguing that climate change litigation is likely to follow the same pattern
as other historical mega-recoveries, where initially unsuccessful claims will transition
into large, successful class-actions); Louis Charles Chambers, Tort Law, Climate
Change and Private Nuisance at 17–21, (Oct. 2012) (unpublished LL.B. thesis,
University of Otago), http://www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago041734.pdf
(arguing that a climate lawsuit against a hypothetical “super emitter,” responsible for
all or substantially all emissions of greenhouse gases, would likely be successful under
ordinary common law principles of liability, but concluding that the number of realworld emitters involved creates potentially unmanageable challenges for would-be
litigants in the absence of judicial innovations).
28. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts:
Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S. C. L. REV. 201, 224–25 (2010);
Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4
(2011).
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or political to be considered by the courts.29
As this Section demonstrates, these latter predictions are
premature as threshold and causation issues have yet to be
navigated in the U.S. court system. While the challenges
facing climate litigation are formidable, legal tools exist that
could be used as a basis for finding U.S. greenhouse gas
producers liable for climate change-related damages—given
the right case, combination of parties, judge, and forum.
A.

Threshold Issues

In the United States, a series of barriers—notably the
political question doctrine, standing, pre-emption, and
displacement—have thus far prevented any climate damages
claim from being argued on its merits. However, as other
scholars have pointed out, these separation-of-powers
doctrines30 and their application in previous climate litigation
have not barred future climate damages claims altogether.31
1.

Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine prevents U.S. courts from
considering cases that raise policy decisions best addressed by
the legislative or executive branch of the government.32 While
attempts have been made to define what constitutes a ‘political
question,’33 the doctrine remains shrouded in ambiguity.34

29. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 28, at 224–25 (arguing “These are not the kinds of
decisions that a common law court, without guidance from previously enacted
statutory or regulatory standards, is capable of making. No appropriate judicial
standard exists enabling a court to determine whether the contributions of any
particular defendant emitter constitute the ‘unreasonable interference’ required by
most definitions of public nuisance . . . . Such decisions are not usually suitable for
adjudication . . . because of the numerous variables to be taken into account and the
impossibility of developing generally applicable premises of reasoning with reference
to which the variables can be judged.”) (internal citations omitted).
30. See JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION:
REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 270–71 (2015) (quoting a U.S.
interviewee, the “separation-of-powers issue . . . comes up in different guises whether
you call it a political question doctrine or displacement or standing . . . . It all comes
down to the same issue of what branch or what government has what power.”).
31. See id. at 274 (arguing “these doctrines have mostly acted to constrain certain
types of petitioners and claims, rather than serving as a blanket barrier to climate
litigation.”).
32. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 590; PEEL, supra note 30, at 273.
33. According to Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, there are six situations “that if
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In the context of climate litigation, some lower courts in the
United States have dismissed climate change-related claims on
the basis that they present non-justiciable political questions.35
However, higher courts, including the Supreme Court in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, have not accepted
the political question doctrine as a bar to climate claims. 36
‘inextricable’ from the case, make dismissal on the basis of the political question
doctrine appropriate.” See Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and
the Political Question Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79 (2008) (quoting Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). Justice Brennan notes it is appropriate to avoid
judicial resolution where there is “(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; (5)
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
(6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.” Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217)
34. See Thorpe, supra note 33, at 81.
35. See Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F.2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y
2005) (ruling that the third Baker factor, i.e. “the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion” applies to the
case. Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an injunction, ruling
that it was impossible to “strike a balance ‘between interests seeking strict schemes to
reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the
economic concern’” without an “initial policy decision” by another branch of
government); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing claims on basis of non-justiciability under the
political question doctrine); Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that both the second and third Baker
factors “[militate] in favor of dismissal.”). For criticisms of the application of the
political question doctrine to these cases, see Thorpe, supra note 33, at 79.
36. American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011) (“[t]he
petitioners [A.E.P.] contend that the federal courts lack authority to adjudicate this
case. Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article
III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions; and further, that no other threshold obstacle
bars review. Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in
Massachusetts, or regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of
the plaintiffs have Article III standing. We therefore affirm, by an equally divided
Court, the Second Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”)
(emphasis added) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–26 (2007)). This
decision was reflected in the Court of Appeals judgment in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,
585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), which concluded that the political question doctrine does
not apply. While the decision in Comer was later vacated due to an unusual procedural
rule, no higher court has questioned the court’s reasoning in concluding that the
political question doctrine does not apply in a climate damages case involving a private
company as a defendant. In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the trial judgment, but based
its decision on displacement, without discussing the political question doctrine. 663 F.
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Some scholars have argued this ruling will likely limit the use
of the political question doctrine in future U.S. cases.37
2.

Standing

According to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff
must have standing or locus standi to bring suit in a U.S.
court.38 To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
injury-in-fact;39 (2) causation;40 and (3) redressability.41 While
straightforward in appearance, this three-part requirement
has been widely criticized for being “uncertain in application
and unpredictable in result.”42
Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
37. See, e.g., PEEL, supra note 30, at 273. Other scholars are slightly less optimistic,
as the decision in Connecticut “did not set precedent in the technical sense,” but
recognized that “it may give an indication of how the Supreme Court as presently
constituted would rule in another case where states sued on public nuisance grounds
about GHGs . . . .” See also Gerrard, supra note 16, at 584.
38. Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not use the term “standing”, but rather
requires that a claim involve a “case or controversy”. Courts have interpreted this as
the “standing” requirement. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574
(1992).
39. See id. at 560 (the “injury-in-fact” must be (1) “concrete and particularized”; and
(2) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”).
40. See id. at 560–61 (the plaintiff must show “there [is] a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court”). In general, the degree of inquiry into
causation at the standing phase is less than the degree of inquiry into causation at the
merit stage. Courts will generally find causation at the standing phase when the
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct in cases involving toxic torts, or
environmental cases, where the defendant’s conduct has made a “meaningful
contribution” to the pollution. See Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from
Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2265 (2015). This contrasts the rigorous criteria
that a plaintiff must satisfy to demonstrate both factual and legal causation at the
merits stage. See infra Section II.B. Causation.
41. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (a plaintiff must show that “it [is] likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.”) (internal citations omitted). Note also that the burden is on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that all three prongs of standing test are satisfied. See DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (parties asserting jurisdiction must “carry the
burden of establishing their standing under Article III”).
42. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 23
(2011). This is particularly the case with environmental claims. See e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Standing on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing
Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/standingon-hot-air-american-electric-power-and-the-bankruptcy-of-standing-doctrine
(“The
unpredictability and ideological nature of standing law seems inherent in the threepart test, whose terms seem to serve as a kind of Rorschach inkblot allowing each
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Thus far, standing has not barred climate litigation for
governmental petitioners.43 Some scholars have argued that it
may pose a challenge for non-governmental plaintiffs, 44 given
that at least one lower court has rejected a climate claim by a
non-governmental petitioner for failure to satisfy the causation
portion of the standing requirement45 (although that case did
not involve a claim for climate damages). However, in
Connecticut, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that the three plaintiff land trusts, which feared their land
holdings would be impacted by climate change, had standing to
seek an injunction, suggesting that at least some nongovernmental plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate standing. 46
In addition, other scholars have pointed out that plaintiffs may
avoid standing barriers simply by avoiding the jurisdictions
issuing such denials. 47 However, whether a plaintiff can

Justice to project her own worldview onto each case. The Court has never defined what
constitutes an ‘injury’ for purposes of standing, leaving it to each Justice to decide
what kinds of grievances should be considered cognizable injuries. The second element
is a mirror in which the judge can perceive her own preferences—when an injury is
‘fairly traceable’ is simply a question of what a judge regards as fair. The third element
replicates the problems of the first one, since the Court must decide whether the
benefits sought by the plaintiff through the remedy should count for constitutional
purposes. One need only look at Massachusetts, where the conservatives were certain
that the case failed all three prongs of the test whereas the liberals were equally
certain that it passed the hurdles.”). See also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988); Causation in Environmental Law, supra note
40 (in the past, courts have used standing—particularly the causation requirement,
discussed in more detail below—”to avoid reaching the merits on [environmental law]
cases they are unwilling or unable to decide.”).
43. See, e.g., American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011);
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007);
PEEL, supra note 30, at 271–73.
44. See PEEL, supra note 30, at 271 (“Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has
twice found standing in the context of climate change, those cases—with their state
government petitioners—did not resolve broader issues about who can bring which
kinds of climate change-related claims.”).
45. See, e.g., Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir.
2013). However, note that this case does not constitute “climate damages litigation”
according to the criteria set out in this Article, as it involved a non-governmental
plaintiff seeking to compel a governmental agency to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions. Note also that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut found that land trusts had standing to
bring an application for injunction, which lends support to the proposition that at least
some non-governmental plaintiffs may have standing. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
46. American Electric Power Co., 582 F.3d, rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410
(2011).
47. See PEEL, supra note 30, at 274 (“standing likely will only be a barrier for
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demonstrate standing will depend largely on the facts of the
case and the rights the plaintiffs allege have been harmed.
3.

Displacement

According to the displacement doctrine, U.S. courts cannot
consider cases involving issues of national concern that are
statutorily regulated by the other branches of government. In
situations where a “statute speaks directly to the question at
issue,” federal common law (of public nuisance, etc.) is
displaced.48 The most relevant federal statute in climate
change litigation is the Clean Air Act.49
Displacement may pose the greatest barrier for climate
damages litigation in the United States.50 In Connecticut, a
case concerning a claim seeking injunctive relief rather than
damages per se, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Air
Act displaced the federal common law in relation to an action
for “curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions.”51 The Court did
not rule on whether the Act also displaced state common law.52
In Kivalina—one of only two U.S. cases that have involved a
plaintiff claiming compensation for climate change-related
damages from a non-governmental defendant—the court
interpreted Connecticut as meaning that a claim for damages
under the federal common law was similarly displaced by the
Clean Air Act,53 despite the fact that the Clean Air Act does
nongovernmental petitioners in jurisdictions that are issuing such denials; pairing
with governmental petitioners will help address the issue even in those places.”).
48. Mark Belleville & Katherine Kennedy, Cool Lawsuits: Is Climate Change
Litigation Dead After Kivalina v. ExxonMobil?, 7 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J.
51, 58, 80 (2012–2013).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2016).
50. See Belleville, supra note 48, at 74 (arguing that of the four ‘jurisdictional bars’
to climate damages litigation, the current state of the law suggests that displacement
is the most significant issue).
51. American Electric Power Co., 564 U.S. at 423.
52. Id. at 429 (“In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal
common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the
preemptive effect of the federal Act. . . . None of the parties have briefed preemption or
otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore
leave the matter open for consideration on remand.”) (citing International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987)).
53. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which itself is being displaced by the
rising sea. But the solution to Kivalina’s dire circumstance must rest in the hands of
the legislative and executive branches of our government, not the federal common
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not directly address liability or apportionment of responsibility
for damages. The extent to which this decision is adopted as
“the law of the land” will determine the success of future
claims for damages under federal common law.54
It is worth noting, however, that the type of climate
compensation act discussed in Section IV would avoid issues of
displacement (and the political questions doctrine) by allowing
the legislative branch to explicitly authorize an appropriate
role for the judiciary in climate damages litigation.55
4.

Pre-emption

Some scholars have also discussed pre-emption as a barrier
to litigation.56 The pre-emption doctrine, often conflated with
displacement, is derived from Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution and provides that, in cases of conflict, federal
common law and statutory law pre-empt state law.57
Given the uncertainty regarding whether non-governmental
petitioners have standing to pursue a federal public nuisance
claim, climate change plaintiffs often invoke state law
(generally nuisance, negligence, and trespass) either in
addition to or in place of federal common law.58 While
defendants would likely argue that state law claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act,59 the statute includes provisions
that explicitly state that they are not.60

law.”). See Belleville, supra note 48, at 59, 74–84 for a critique of the application of the
displacement doctrine in this case.
54. Belleville, supra note 48, at 74.
55. See infra Section IV, “Climate Damages Litigation.”
56. See, e.g., Belleville, supra note 48, at 73–74 (explaining that federal legislation
‘displaces’ federal common law, while state law is ‘preempted’ by federal law, both
common and legislated). Notably, other comprehensive overviews of barriers to climate
litigation have not included preemption. See, e.g., PEEL, supra note 30, at 271.
57. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
58. Specifically, this uncertainty concerns whether nongovernmental petitions can
pursue federal public nuisance claims, and whether other federal common law theories
can adequately address the damage suffered. See Belleville, supra note 48, at 72–73;
see also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854; Kivalina, 663 F.
Supp. 2d at 869.
59. See Belleville, supra note 48, at 77; Gerrard, supra note 16, at 574 (“[T]he
defendants would certainly argue that the CAA [Clean Air Act] displaces [preempts]
state common law nuisance claims as well.”).
60. See 42 U.S.C § 7604(e) (2012).
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In any event, it is certainly possible that, at some point, a
climate damages claim with the correct combination of parties,
judge, and forum will be able to succeed on the threshold
issues and proceed to the merits stage of examination. In such
a case, causation issues will come under greater judicial
scrutiny.61
B.

Causation

In order to recover damages in tort litigation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate a causal relationship between the
defendant’s action or behavior and the injury suffered. This
entails meeting the requirements set out for both factual
causation and proximate (legal) causation at the merits
stage.62
Both factual and proximate causation present challenges for
climate damages litigation; many scholars consider these
requirements as the most significant barriers to liability. 63 As
61. There has been substantial disagreement in the courts and among commentators
about when factual causation should be analyzed: during the standing phase or
afterwards on the merits. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 42, at 122. In most cases, during
the standing phase, courts find causation when the damage is ‘fairly traceable’ to the
defendant’s action or behavior—however, “the standard for what is considered fairly
traceable is unclear. In some cases, a but-for causal connection has been considered
sufficient for standing purposes.” Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 40, at
2264–65. Should courts choose to incorporate more rigorous factual causation inquiries
in the standing phase, as suggested by the concurring judgment in Kivalina, it may
result in climate damage claims being thrown out prematurely. See id. at 2272
(arguing “[s]hifting some of the factual analysis for establishing causation out of
standing analysis would help reduce the bias against finding standing in
environmental suits”). See also Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696
F.3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (concurring opinion).
62. Note that the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces the term ‘proximate cause’
with ‘scope of liability’, while the Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects the term in
favor of ‘legal cause’. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF
PHYSICAL HARM § 29 (AM. LAW INST., 2012); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
431 (AM. LAW INST. (1965). Note also that both factual and proximate causation are
requirements in all forms of tort claims. See Kysar, supra note 28, at 17 (“[N]or will it
necessarily matter whether plaintiffs’ case is styled as a negligence, strict liability,
private nuisance, public nuisance, or products liability action, given the availability of
proximate causation and other liability-curtailing devices under each theory.”) At least
one scholar, however, has argued that proximate causation was not required in the
public nuisance case Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d
Cir. 2000), although he notes that this does not appear to be the majority approach.
See Grossman, supra note 9, at 27 n.130.
63. See, e.g., Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate
Change Litigation Against Corporate Defendants, 35 BNA ENV’T REP. 2365, 2369
(2004) (“Causation is the crucial issue for defendants because it will be the most
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a U.S. court has yet to consider a climate damages claim on the
merits, this Section draws on the approaches adopted by courts
to address similar causation challenges in other types of
claims, such as environmental, toxic, and mass torts.64
1.

Factual Causation

Factual causation is primarily concerned with the scientific
relationship between the defendant’s action or behavior and
the alleged injury, and is often broken down further into
general causation and specific causation.65 General causation
refers to whether the action in question could have caused the
alleged injury, while specific causation refers to whether the
action in question “more likely than not” actually caused the
alleged injury.66
a.

General Causation

General causation is considered an objective inquiry, and is
often established through statistical, probabilistic, and
epidemiological studies. 67 For example, in toxic tort cases such
as those involving Agent Orange, plaintiffs relied upon
scientific data demonstrating the association between exposure
to the substance and health problems as evidence of general
causation.68
In the context of a climate damages case, for example,

difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate . . . ”); Kysar, supra note 28, at 29 (“The most
significant challenge for climate change tort suits lies in proving causation.”);
Penalver, supra note 9, at 564, 579 (“[S]ome of the obstacles to a tort approach to
climate change [include] establishing causation, calculating the proper remedies, and
choosing a structure for implementing a tort-based approach. The greatest of these
problems is that of causation.”).
64. Others have noted the parallels between toxic tort cases and climate change
cases. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 22; Penalver, supra note 9, at 579.
65. Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 40 at 2262; Penalver, supra note 9,
at 579. Note that general causation has also been referred to as “generic causation”
and specific causation has also been referred to as “individual causation.”
66. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-7657, 1997 WL 535163, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 18, 1997); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1352 (N.D.
Ga. 2001) (citing Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999))
(defining general causation as “the capacity of a product to cause injury,” and specific
causation as “proof that the product in question caused the injury of which the plaintiff
complains.”).
67. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 22.
68. Id.
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statistical models found in studies such as those released by
the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) could be used to demonstrate that greenhouse
gas emissions could have caused a rise in sea-levels and
consequent property damage.69 The U.S. Supreme Court
confirmed the scientific consensus regarding climate change in
Massachusetts v. EPA,70 further supporting the argument for
general causation.
b.

Specific Causation

In contrast, courts have not considered studies such as those
undertaken by the IPCC as adequate evidence of specific
causation.71 Most often, specific causation is established
through the “but for” test, which requires proof that a
defendant’s actions or behavior were “a necessary element” in
bringing about the injury before liability can apply. 72
As others have pointed out,73 the “but for” causal inquiry
presents unique problems for climate damages plaintiffs: it
may be difficult to demonstrate that damage suffered by a
plaintiff was the result of climate change.74 Furthermore, even

69. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 7 at 4. Note that
in toxic torts cases, there are also challenges associated with determining which
experts and studies to allow. See, e.g., Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, Whither
Daubert? Reliable Resolution of Scientifically-Based Causality Issues in Toxic Tort
Cases, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 565–67 (1998).
70. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 504 (2007) (“A
well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase
in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe
the two trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it
acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of
reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—of a ‘greenhouse
gas.’”). See also Jennifer Kilinski, International Climate Change Liability, 18 J.
TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL. 377, 400–01 (2009).
71. Grossman, supra note 9, at 23.
72. See Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation Doctrines Central to
Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2009) (“under orthodox common law
rules concerning causation, a tortfeasor is liable for an indivisible injury that would
not have happened absent that party’s breach.”); Richard W. Wring, Causation,
Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001,
1019 (1988) (defining specific cause as a “necessary element in a set of antecedent
actual conditions that were sufficient for the occurrence of the result.”).
73. See, e.g., Michael Duffy, Climate Change Causation: Harmonizing Tort Law and
Scientific Probability, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH & ENVTL. L. 185 (2009); Kysar, supra note
28.
74. The ability of a plaintiff to demonstrate, on a preponderance of evidence, that
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where a plaintiff can establish such a link, the actions of a single defendant, or even a group of defendants, would not have
caused climate change alone. In other words, the emissions of a
single greenhouse gas producer cannot be singled out as a
“necessary element” for the damage caused by climate change.
Toxic tort claims are plagued by similar issues of identifying
a “but for” cause. As a result, courts have developed a series of
alternative approaches for determining specific causation in
cases where “it is either impossible or overwhelmingly
burdensome to isolate causation among defendants.”75 These
approaches, some of which are outlined below, suggest that a
court could find specific causation in a climate damages case
given the right facts, combination of parties, judge, and forum.
i.

Material Contribution Approach

Sometimes referred to as the “substantial-factor test,” the
material contribution approach to causation is useful where
“two forces are actively operating, one because of the
defendant’s [activity], the other not because of any misconduct
on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm

climate change caused the damages complained of will depend on the type of damages
claimed and the available scientific evidence. Damages that arise from ongoing shifts
in climate, such as the costs of adapting infrastructure to changing regional conditions
or the spread of new pests or weeds beyond their historic range, may be more easily
linked to climate change than, for instance, damages from a single weather event. For
example, the Kivalina case—concerning the relocation of a village due to a pattern of
storms and early melting of sea ice—falls within this category of damages claims. 663
F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). However, even in relation to single weather events,
there are new scientific methodologies that can provide a statistical link between
climate change and particular events, particularly in the case of heat waves, drought
and extreme precipitation. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES,
ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/21852/attributionof-extreme-weather-events-in-the-context-of-climate-change; Stephanie C. Herring et
al., Explaining Extreme Events of 2014 from a Climate Perspective, 96 BULL. A MER.
METEOR.
SOC.
S1
(2015),
http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/BAMSExplainingExtremeEvents2014.1.
75. Daniel J. Grimm, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A Proposed
Model for Allocating Tort Damages among CO 2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209,
216 (2007) (citing James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and
Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO.
L.J. 659, 659 (2000) (“plaintiffs have been permitted to recover under market share
liability ‘without proof of individual causation.’”)). Grimm argues that market share
liability is one such approach, and would provide “an ideal platform for developing a
liability regime capable of managing climate change-based torts.” Id. at 211.
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to another.”76 In such cases, the court may find liability where
a defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing
about or a material contribution to the plaintiff’s injury.77
Courts in the United States have favored the material
contribution approach in environmental and toxic torts cases
where a chemical or environmental factor could have
independently caused the injury at issue.78 As Smith and
Shearman explain, “[a] test based on a material increase in
risk would clearly improve the prospects of success for climate
change plaintiffs.”79
ii.

Co-Mingled Product Approach

Courts in the United States developed the co-mingled
product approach in response to cases involving groundwater
contamination from the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl
ether (MTBE). According to one U.S. district court, “[w]hen a
plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or liquid products . . .
of many suppliers were present in a completely commingled or
blended state at the time and place that the risk of harm
occurred, and the commingled product caused a single
indivisible injury, then each of the products should be deemed
to have caused the harm.”80
Some commentators have identified the co-mingled product
approach as potentially applicable to climate damages
litigation.81 Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions resemble MTBE
in significant ways; emissions have no “chemical signature”

76. Shelly Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of
the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1289, 1297 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (A M. LAW INST.
1965)).
77. See, e.g., Shetterly v. Raymark Indus., 117 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1997) (“In
order to sustain an action against Raymark for asbestos related injuries, Plaintiffs
must prove that Raymark products were a substantial causative factor in their
injuries.”) (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 1303–04.
79. JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: ANALYSING
LAW, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND IMPACTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND
PROPERTY 110 (2006).
80. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE), 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 377–78
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
THE

81. See, e.g., Lauren Case, Climate Change: A New Realm of Tort Litigation and
How to Recover When the Litigation Heats Up, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265, 286–88
(2011).
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which would allow them to be traced to particular emitters,
and they co-mingle in the global atmosphere.82
iii. Market Share Approach
Courts in the United States developed the market share
approach in the context of litigation brought by women who
claimed to have suffered injuries due to ingestion of
diethylstilbestrol (DES) by their mothers during pregnancy,
allowing courts to assign liability for harm caused by a product
based on a defendant’s respective “share” in the manufacture
and sale of the product.83
As one scholar has suggested, “a market share-based
liability regime may actually approximate specific causation
better when applied to global warming than when applied to
chemically fungible products like DES.”84 Greenhouse gas
producers could be held liable for climate damages according to
their share of global CO2 emissions.85 Recent studies
quantifying the relative contribution of major fossil fuel
companies to global greenhouse gas emissions would facilitate
the use of such an approach in the climate damages context.
Importantly, a recent study by Richard Heede—elaborated in
Section V—found ninety entities responsible for 63 percent of
total greenhouse gas emissions to date, and determined the
percentages attached to each individual entity.86
2.

Proximate Causation

Proximate causation incorporates a policy dimension absent
in factual causation inquiries, asking whether the defendant’s
action or behavior is sufficiently related to the injury to hold
them liable for the resulting damages.87 In other words,
82. See Case, supra note 81, at 286–88, 295–97.
83. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (N.Y. 1989); Enright v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377 (N.Y. 1991) (affirming the use of a market share approach).
84. Grimm, supra note 75, at 221. See also Case, supra note 81, at 293 (explaining
“[m]arket share liability theory is perhaps the best collective liability theory for
plaintiffs in climate change cases.”).
85. See Grimm, supra note 75, at 221; Penalver, supra note 9, at 564, 579.
86. See generally Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and
Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 229 (2014).
87. See Brinker, supra note 76, at 1297; Nancy Lee Firak, Alternative Forms of
Liability: Developing Policy Aspects of the Cause-in-Fact Requirement of Tort Law, 20
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proximate causation is used to limit liability in cases where the
requirements of factual causation are satisfied, yet notions of
reasonableness suggest a defendant should not be held
responsible.88
As one scholar has stated, “[t]he touchstone of proximate
causation is ‘foreseeability.’”89 That is, a defendant can only be
held liable for the damages that are the foreseeable result of
their action or behavior, regardless of the strength of the
factual causal relationship. 90 Other factors considered in the
context of proximate causation include the geographic and
temporal distance between the action or behavior and the
damage, and the defendant’s degree of involvement in or
control over the plaintiff’s injury.91
In the context of climate damages claims, scholars have
generally argued that proximate causation will present fewer

ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1042 (1988).
88. See Grimm, supra note 75, at 227.
89. Benjamin Reese, Too Many Cooks in the Climate Change Kitchen: The Case for
an Administrative Remedy for Damages Caused by Increased Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 355, 367 (2015). As Reese points out,
“foreseeability” has been considered part of both the duty and causation of negligence
claims. Id. at 367 n. 72. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 28, at 10–20 (arguing that “for
purposes of limning [sic] greenhouse gas tort responsibilities, it may not matter
whether plaintiffs’ claims hit a road block at the duty stage á [sic] la Cardozo, or only
later at the proximate causation stage á [sic] la Andrews, given the analytical
challenges facing plaintiffs will be similar in either case.”). See also Young v. Bryco
Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“Legal causation is essentially a question
of foreseeability.”).
90. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in
Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 664
(2000) (foreseeability is necessary to determine if “the type of harm suffered by the
plaintiff was, qualitatively and quantitatively, of such a nature that a reasonable
person would have taken it into account in performing the risk-utility calculus
relevant to deeming the defendant’s conduct negligent.”); Gerrard, supra note 16, at
592 (“A party is only liable for expected harms from their bad conduct. Where the
action is intentional or reckless, this liability extends even to harms that were
unlikely.”).
91. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 25–27; City of Bloomington, Ind. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that Monsanto was not liable for
nuisance because “Westinghouse was in control of the product purchased and was
solely responsible for the nuisance it created.”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(“MTBE”), 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (suggesting that a defendant can
be held liable for damages, even if others outside of the defendant’s control contributed
to the injury). On the relevance of temporal and geographic distance in causation, see
Shannon Roesler, Responding to Climate-Related Harms: A Role for the Courts?, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY THE
IPCC 181, 185–91 (Robin Craig & Stephen Miller eds., 2016).
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challenges than factual causation.92 It is reasonable to argue
that climate damages were foreseeable by greenhouse gas
producers since at least the first IPCC study was released in
1990.93 As our understanding of climate science and its
impacts continues to improve the foreseeability of damages
will only increase. 94
Similarly, a plaintiff could reasonably argue that the
defendants exercised sufficient control over climate damages.
Unlike in handgun cases, where damages were found to have
been caused by individuals misusing the product in a manner
outside the control of the manufacturer,95 no misuse is
involved with fossil fuels. Individuals use emission-producing
products in the manner intended by the manufacturer, making
the resulting damage both foreseeable and controllable.96
As this Section outlines, while the threshold issues and
causation challenges facing climate litigation are formidable,
legal tools exist that plaintiffs could potentially use as a basis
for finding U.S. greenhouse gas producers liable for climate
change-related damages given the right facts, combination of
parties, judge, and forum.
III. TRANSNATIONAL CLIMATE DAMAGES LITIGATION
Most scholars have focused on the potential success of
climate damages litigation involving U.S. plaintiffs seeking to
have their claims against U.S. defendants heard in U.S.
courts.97 U.S. emissions, however, cause climate change in
conjunction with emissions produced by a large number of

92. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 89, at 368; Grossman, supra note 9, at 25–27.
93. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 27. Note also recent reports suggesting that the
largest U.S. greenhouse gas producer, ExxonMobil, knew about climate change as
early as 1981. See Suzanne Goldberg, Exxon Knew of Climate Change in 1981, Email
Says – But It Funded Deniers for 27 More Years, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/08/exxon-climate-change-1981climate-denier-funding.
94. See David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. ST. L. Rev. 1742, 1780–81 (2007).
95. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 26–27 (discussing municipal claims against
handgun manufacturer, particularly Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v.
Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d. 536 (3d Cir. 2001)).
96. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 27.
97. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9; Case, supra note 81; Hunter & Salzman, supra
note 27; Penalver, supra note 9; Gifford, supra note 28; Kysar, supra note 28.
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producers around the world.98 The effects of these emissions
are felt in different ways by the people of different countries.99
This Section introduces the first of two potentialities that
could change the climate damages litigation landscape
significantly and rapidly: transnational litigation. Specifically,
it discusses the possibility of a foreign plaintiff bringing a
climate damages claim against a U.S. non-governmental
defendant, such as a greenhouse gas producer, in a U.S. court.
This Section also examines the perhaps more significant
possibility of a foreign plaintiff suing a U.S. greenhouse gas
producer in a foreign country, and then seeking to have that
judgment recognized in the United States or in other countries
in which the U.S. defendant has assets. These scenarios
present complex questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
A.

Jurisdiction

In the United States, a court must possess both subject
matter jurisdiction and in personam or personal jurisdiction in
order to consider a case. 100 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to
a court’s ability to hear and decide a particular type of case,
whereas personal jurisdiction refers to a court’s ability to
exercise jurisdiction over the actors involved.101 As legal
scholar Richard Lord writes, “a right is of little use unless a
tribunal can be found to uphold and enforce it.”102

98. Hunter, supra note 27, at 1745.
99. See generally CLIMATE VULNERABILITY FORUM & DARA, supra note 3.
100. Subject matter jurisdiction is also referred to as “jurisdiction to prescribe,”
while in personam or personal jurisdiction is also referred to as “jurisdiction to
adjudicate” according to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations LAW pt. IV,
introductory n. (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Jurisdictional issues are generally analyzed in
this order. See DAVID EPSTEIN & CHARLES S BALDWIN, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A
GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY 95 (4th ed. 2010). Note that for the
sake of clarity, this Article will use the terms subject matter jurisdiction and personal
or in personam jurisdiction as opposed to the terms used in the Restatement.
101. See EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 95; Zasloff, supra note 9, at 1875–80, for a
discussion of whether a U.S. court might assert jurisdiction against an Indian car
company, Tata, for climate-related damage caused in the United States, the reverse of
the scenario being discussed here.
102. Lord, supra note 16, at 44.
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Both state and federal courts can exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over cases involving multiple jurisdictions, 103
although much transnational litigation occurs at a federal
level.104 Notably, Article III of the U.S. Constitution, along
with federal statutes, authorizes federal courts to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over diversity actions between U.S.
and foreign citizens, 105 actions based on the Alien Tort Claims
Act,106 and actions against foreign states under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.107
However, federal courts may decline to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. 108

103. Most state courts are courts of “general jurisdiction,” meaning they are
assumed to have subject matter jurisdiction over any case falling under state or
federal law. Federal courts, on the other hand, are courts of “specific jurisdiction,”
meaning they can only exercise subject matter jurisdiction explicitly granted by U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 and federal statute. See, e.g., Verlinden BV v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) (“Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds established by the Constitution.”); Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (explaining
that federal subject matter jurisdiction is “limited to those subjects encompassed
within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.”) Notably, the types of cases enumerated
under Article III are not the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, and state courts
can exercise concurrent jurisdiction unless expressly forbidden by Congress. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 96–97 (quoting Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA L. REV. 85, 123 n.142 (1983)).
104. U.S. federal courts and federal law have generally been perceived as being
hospitable to transnational litigation. See Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal
Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93
N.C. L. Rev. 995, 998 (2015). Additionally, foreign defendants have a right to remove
the case from a state court to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) & (b)
(2012). The most common types of transnational litigation in state courts include torts,
family law, and employment law. See EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 96–99; GARY BORN &
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 10
(5th ed. 2011).
105. U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3) (2012). Note that the amount in
controversy must exceed $75,000 to be considered by a court under diversity of
citizenship. Id. § 1332.
106. Id. § 1350 (2012).
107. Id. § 1330(a) (2012). Note that federal courts also exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over: (1) “cases involving federal questions arising under the U.S.
Constitution, statutes, and regulations,” id. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship
cases, between citizens of different U.S. states,” id. § 1332, although these grants of
jurisdiction are less applicable in international litigation. See BORN, supra note 104, at
11.
108. BORN, supra note 104, at 384. Courts may also decline to exercise jurisdiction
on the basis of international comity and unreasonableness. EPSTEIN, supra note 100,

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss2/3

24

Byers et al.: The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation

288

WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

[Vol. 7:2

While weight is given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum,109 the
forum non conveniens doctrine allows courts to dismiss a case
after examining the various private and public interests
involved, if a foreign court would be “adequate” and
substantially more convenient or appropriate.110
Therefore, if a foreign plaintiff sues a U.S. nongovernmental defendant for transnational climate damages, a
U.S. court could foreseeably find subject matter jurisdiction.
This jurisdiction could be based on the “diverse citizenship” of
the parties involves, the headquarters of the defendants, or the
quantity of greenhouse gas emissions occurring within the
United States.111 However, a U.S. defendant may seek to have
at 128. According to EPSTEIN, the comity and unreasonableness rules emerge from the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403 (A M. LAW INST. 1987). See, e.g.,
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir.
1979). Under the doctrine of comity, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction in
cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction, and a substantial conflict between U.S.
laws and the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, whereas the unreasonableness rule
provides that a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction where it appears to be
unreasonable. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1046–49
(2d Cir. 1996). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 121–30, for a more in-depth
discussion of these two limitations of subject matter jurisdiction.
109. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). See generally
Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL.
L. REV. 1259 (1986). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the selection of a
U.S. court by a foreign plaintiff “will likely make a forum less convenient than will the
presence of a local plaintiff.” RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI ET AL., FORUM
NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 116 (2007). As a result, in
transnational litigation, “a foreign plaintiff’s choice [of forum] deserves less deference
[than a local plaintiff’s choice].” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56
(1981).
110. See EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 119 (summarizing the forum non conveniens
test articulated in Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
The test is as follows (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original):
 First, determine whether there is an adequate alternative forum that can try
the entire case;
 Second, “consider all relevant factors of private interests, weighing in the
balance a strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial form choice;”
 Third, if the balance of interest is in or near “equipoise,” consider whether the
public interest favors a foreign forum;
 Fourth, if the balance favors a foreign forum, ensure that plaintiffs can
reinstate their suit in the alternative forum without “undue inconvenience or
prejudice.” For an overview of the forum non conveniens doctrine, see also
BORN, supra note 104, at 365–459.
111. Note that it is unlikely that a foreign plaintiff could bring a climate action
against a U.S. defendant on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), as the Act
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the case dismissed based on forum non conveniens, arguing
that an adequate alternative forum for litigation exists, and
that private and public interest favour this alternative
forum.112 The success of such an argument would depend on
whether the defendant would be amenable to being sued in an
adequate alternative forum, likely a court in the plaintiff’s
home state.113
2.

Personal Jurisdiction

Both state and federal courts can exercise personal
jurisdiction over transnational litigation where authorized by
statute114 and consistent with the constitutional principles of
due process.115 According to the test outlined in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, due process requires that a defendant
have minimum contacts with the forum such that the exercise
of jurisdiction accords with the notions of “fair play and

only applies to torts “committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). As of yet, the United States is not party to
any treaty that forbids—or even limits—the emissions of greenhouse gases. See
Gerrard, supra note 16, at 44. Perhaps even more importantly, in its modern revival
(post-1980), the ATCA has only been applied to conduct committed outside the United
States.
112. This was the argument made in Texaco Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support
of Its Renewed Motions to Dismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens and International
Comity at 22–51, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No-93 Civi. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999).
See also Howard Erichson, The Chevron-Ecuador Dispute, Forum Non Conveniens, and
the Problem of Ex Ante Inadequacy, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 417, 425 (2013).
113. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at 254 n.22 (1981) (“At the outset of
any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an
alternative forum.”). Based on this case, “an alternative forum is normally considered
adequate if the defendant is subject to jurisdiction in the alternative forum even if the
alternative forum has [different] laws.” Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of
the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 517 (2009).
114. See BORN, supra note 104, at 82 (“All the states of the Union have enacted
statutes (or rules of court) defining the personal jurisdiction of state courts over nonresident defendants.”) See generally ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
§ 4.01 (2d ed. 1991) (describing and reproducing state long-arm statutes). Statutory
authorization for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants is derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which allows federal
courts to (1) “borrow” the long arm statute of the state in which they sit; (2) exercise
personal jurisdiction according to applicable federal statute; or (3) exercise personal
jurisdiction within the limits of the Constitutional principles of due process in certain
federal question cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. (4)(k). See also BORN, supra note 104, at 74.
115. Note also that unlike with subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant can, either
explicitly or implicitly, waive personal jurisdiction. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 173.
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substantial justice.”116
While there is a lack of consensus regarding what actions
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement,117 courts will
generally consider: (1) the quantity of contacts with the forum
state; (2) the nature and quality of contacts; (3) the source and
connection of the cause of action with these contacts; (4) the
interest of the state in providing a forum; and (5) the
convenience of the parties, when determining whether to
exercise personal jurisdiction.118
The factors relevant to determining whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction accords with the notions of fair play and
substantial justice include: “(1) [the] burden on the defendant
in litigation in the forum state; (2) the interests of the forum
state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest
of the several states in further fundamental substantive social
policies.”119
In the context of a transnational climate damages claim
involving a foreign plaintiff suing a U.S. greenhouse gas
producer, a U.S. court would likely find that exercising
personal jurisdiction accords with the notions of fair play and
substantial justice.120 A court would reach this decision by
applying the factors relevant to determining whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction accords with the notions of fair
play and substantial justice stated above to this scenario. In
reference to the first factor, a U.S. greenhouse gas producer
116. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945).
117. Various standards have been adopted in state and federal courts. In Asahi
Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court outlines two of the
predominant standards used in courts: the “stream of commerce” theory, which allows
courts to exercise jurisdiction where a consumer uses the defendant’s product in the
forum, and a stricter “purposeful direction” standard, which allows courts to exercise
jurisdiction only where a defendant has taken purposeful action towards the forum,
such as advertising in the forum state or marketing a product through a regular
channel. 480 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1987). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 158–
66.
118. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
119. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 164 (citations omitted). Courts generally agree that
the stronger the connection between the defendant and the forum, the greater the
burden on the defendant to show that such an exercise of jurisdiction in unreasonable.
Id.
120. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 (discussing the test to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate).
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would be unlikely to suffer any burden in litigating in the
United States. The United States would also have an interest
as the forum state to consider the liability of U.S. greenhouse
gas producers. The foreign plaintiff may have an interest in
holding litigation in the United States in order to obtain relief
in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s assets are located.
A U.S. court would almost certainly find that minimum
contacts exist between a U.S. defendant and the United States.
Extensive or “general” contact, which can be established by
domicile or incorporation, satisfies this minimum contacts
requirement. This would allow a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant “with respect to all claims
arising from any of the defendant’s activities, including
activities unrelated to the forum state.”121
If the defendant’s interactions with the United States are
less extensive than general contact, a U.S. court could still
exercise personal jurisdiction based on “specific contacts.” This
would limit the claims heard by a court to those “that are
related to or arise out of a defendant’s contacts with the
forum.”122 As one commentator noted, “[t]he line between
general and specific [contacts] is obviously not a bright one,
and the question will require a case-by-case analysis of the
particular statutory grant of jurisdiction and the facts of each
case.”123 A U.S. court could likely find personal jurisdiction
based on a greenhouse gas producer’s either general or specific
contacts with the United States, given the close relationship
that exists between the nature of a foreign plaintiff’s claim and
the activities of that producer.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the many
diverse legal approaches in other countries related to personal
jurisdiction. Yet, it is important to note that in many countries,
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over defendants that are
not connected with the jurisdiction, with leave of the court or
otherwise, where the case involves harm to real property
located within the jurisdiction. 124 It is possible that U.S.
121. BORN, supra note 104, at 83–84. Other factors considered when determining
whether there is general jurisdiction include: nationality, residence, registration to do
business, consent, waiver, and continuous and systemic activity. Id. at 109.
122. BORN, supra note 104, at 90.
123. EPSTEIN, supra note 100, at 167 (citations omitted).
124. AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 17 (Andrew Dickinson et al. eds., (2014) (“In most
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defendants could find plaintiffs asserting personal jurisdiction
over them notwithstanding that they have little or no presence
in the jurisdiction.
B.

Choice of Law

Once a court has established subject matter and personal
jurisdiction over a case involving parties from multiple
jurisdictions, it may be necessary for it to consider whether to
apply domestic forum law or the foreign law of another
country. While courts will select forum law most often,125 it is
possible for courts, including those in the United States, to
apply foreign law instead. Choice of law analysis describes the
processes and rules used by courts to make this determination.
Numerous scholars have described choice of law as a “dismal
swamp, filled with quaking quagmires” due to its complex and
changing nature.126 In the United States, choice of law regimes
vary between states largely based on the First Restatement
Conflict of Laws127 and Second Restatement Conflict of
Laws.128 Some states, however, have adopted hybrid
international cases, personal jurisdiction is established by service out of the
jurisdiction pursuant to the rules of court, a form of delegated legislation which is
made by Rules Committees of the courts.”). See, e.g., United Kingdom Practice
Direction 6B, s. 3.1 (9) and (11); New Zealand High Court Rules, r. 9.27. See Andrew
Gage & Margaretha Wewerinke, Taking Climate Justice into Our Own Hands: A
Model Climate Compensation Act, WEST COAST ENVTL LAW
14–15 (2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2906252 (discussing examples of national rules regarding
jurisdiction).
125. Empirical studies have found that modern choice-of-law systems, such as that
found in the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws, tend to favor the application of
forum law. See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum
Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 560–66
(2002); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
Ga. L. Rev. 49, 86 (1992). See also Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution:
An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 377–78 (1992).
126. See William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
Many scholars have since taken up this analogy, including JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 231–32 (Aspen Publishers eds., 6th ed.
2008).
127. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1934). States that
follow the traditional choice of law approach as articulated in the First Restatement
Conflict of Laws include, Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100,
2011 WL 1375011, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. LAW INST. 1971). States that
follow the significant relationship choice of law approach as articulated in the Second
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regimes.129
In U.S. states that follow the First Restatement Conflict of
Laws, courts take a traditional territorial approach to the
choice of law.130 They will generally apply the law of the place
of wrong, defined as the place “where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort” occurred.131 This is
usually, but not necessarily, the place of injury or damage.132
In U.S. states that follow the more modern choice of law
approach, set out in the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws,
courts will consider factors other than the place of injury or
damage. These include the place where the event giving rise to
the damage occurred; the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
the place where their relationship, if any, is centred. 133 With
these factors in mind, a court will determine and apply the law
of the state with the “most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties.”134
Restatement Conflict of Laws include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, MDL No. 2100, 2011 WL 1375011, at *10–
13 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011).
129. California and the District of Columbia have explicitly adopted the “government
interest analysis” test to determine choice of law. See Herma Hill Kay, Currie’s Interest
Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle, but Winning the War, 31 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 123, 126 (2001). The government interest analysis is a three-step test related
to the Second Restatement’s significant relationship test, which involves determining
(1) whether the laws in the two jurisdictions differ as applied to the facts of the case;
(2) if they differ, whether a “true conflict” exists where each state has an interest in
applying its laws; and (3) which state’s interest would be more impaired if its laws
were not applied. See C.K. Liew v. Official Receiver & Liquidator, 685 F.2d 1192, 1196
(9th Cir. 1982).
130. See BORN, supra note 104, at 766.
131. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 127, at § 377.
132. See David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1196, 1196–97 (1997).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 145.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 145. Courts
will also consider: the needs of the interstate and international systems; the relevant
policies of the state of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested states; the
protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law; certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and the ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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Under these principal choice-of-law regimes, a U.S. court
could conceivably choose to apply foreign law to transnational
climate litigation involving a foreign plaintiff and U.S.
defendant. This scenario is more likely under the traditional
choice-of-law approach in the First Restatement, which
dictates that the law of the place of injury applies in
transnational tort litigation.135
As outlined above, the Second Restatement takes a broader
approach when determining choice of law. Whether a court
applies forum law or the law of the country where climate
damages occurred will largely depend upon which country is
deemed to have the “most significant relationship” with the
parties and the dispute.136
The relative benefits for foreign plaintiffs of either choice—
forum or foreign law—will depend largely upon the specifics of
the case. Foreign plaintiffs are often drawn to U.S. courts for
transnational litigation due to the (sometimes inaccurate)
perception that U.S. tort law is more favorable than the law of
the country where the injury or damage occurred.137
However, the application of foreign law may be particularly
attractive to foreign plaintiffs pursuing climate damages
litigation in U.S. courts because of the different approaches
and bases for liability in other countries. Lawyers from several
countries and affiliated with the Environmental Law Alliance
Worldwide have identified several countries with laws that are
well suited for climate damages claims:
We found that civil law jurisdictions are more likely to
have a particular statute under which a case seeking
compensation for climate damages could be filed. In
particular, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico all have laws
under which a climate-related claim could be filed. One
exception is the common law country of Kenya, which

CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 6(2).
135. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 127, at § 377. See also
BORN, supra note 104 at 766–67.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 128, at § 145.
137. The United States has long been a “magnet” forum for transnational litigation
due to its pro-plaintiff legal environment, cultivated by “trial by jury, liberal pretrial
discovery, representation by experienced litigators for a [contingency] feed […]
substantially higher damage awards, and relatively prompt trial settings.” Walter W.
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign
Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1177 (2005).
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also has a relevant law that opens the door to climate
litigation as well as a specialized environmental
court. . . .
Constitutions in some countries contain provisions that
would support a climate damages case filed against a
private corporation. Our research found clear
indications that courts in Brazil and Colombia will hold
private corporations liable for violating fundamental
rights; and very likely that courts in Ecuador, India,
Kenya and Mexico would do so, too. Because
constitutional provisions can be coupled with strong
laws in Brazil, Colombia, Kenya and Mexico, filing a
case in one of these four countries gains even more
appeal.138
Given that the emissions that are alleged to be tortious do
not occur in any one country, it might be argued that the tort,
if it occurs anywhere, must occur in the jurisdiction where the
harm occurs. That country may have a more significant
relationship than a country where only some of the potential
defendants reside and a small fraction of the emissions
occurred. Regardless of the benefits of forum or foreign law,
the forum court decides which law to apply.139

138. ENVTL. LAW ALL. WORLDWIDE, Holding Corporations Accountable for Damaging
the
Climate
3
(2014),
https://www.elaw.org/system/files/elaw.climate.litigation.report.pdf.
See
also
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, Oct. 5, 1988, art. 225 § 3 (“[T]he conduct
and activities considered harmful to the environment shall subject the offender,
individuals or legal entities, to criminal and administrative sanctions, regardless of
the obligation to repair the damage caused.”); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R.
1987 S.C. 1086, 1089–90 (expanding the ambit of Article 32 to allow Indian courts to
compensate private party victims for Constitutional rights violations, including those
breached by other private citizens, corporations, and legal persons); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: GIVING FORCE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN AFRICA 28 (2007). See generally Lord, supra note 16;
Andrew Gage & Michael Byers, Payback Time: What the Internationalization of
Climate Change Litigation Could Mean for Canadian Oil Companies 13, 18 (2014)
(reviewing options available to climate damages plaintiffs under different legal
systems).
139. Note that some other countries have adopted more flexible rules relating to
choice of law for transnational environmental litigation. According to the Rome II
regulation, which is intended to apply across the European Union, the plaintiff has the
choice whether to sue based on the laws of the “country where the damage occurred” or
the country where “the event giving rise to the damage occurred.” Commission
Regulation 864/2007 of July 11, 2007, On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40–49 (EC), http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32007R0864. As a result, if a court in an EU country
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Given the threshold issues currently facing climate litigation
in the United States, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that
foreign plaintiffs will instead opt to sue U.S. defendants in
their own courts.140 Alternatively, as mentioned above, a
defendant may argue that a case should not be heard in the
United States under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.141
In either case, foreign plaintiffs may first obtain a judgment
for climate change-related damages in a foreign court.
Afterwards, they may seek to have that judgment recognized
and enforced in other countries where the defendant’s assets
are located, including the United States.142
found jurisdiction over a climate change litigation case, perhaps on the basis of the
particularly broad jurisdiction asserted in some of those countries, a U.S. greenhouse
gas producer could be held to the law of the plaintiff’s choosing. The possibility that a
U.S. court might then recognize and enforce the foreign judgment is discussed in the
following Section. See also Lord, supra note 16, at 484 (“The Rome II regime is of
potentially great significance in climate change litigation, where nationals in
developing countries may allege damage suffered in those countries as a result of
actions by corporations domiciled in the EU. Such corporations may be sued in their
State of domicile, with the claimant able to rely on the law of his/her own State.”).
140. Traditionally, foreign litigants have been drawn to the United States, “as a
moth is drawn to the light.” Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock,
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18
SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 32 (2012) (quoting Lord Denning in Smith Kline & French Labs Ltd.
v. Bloch, 1 W.L.R. 730, 711 (C.A. 1982)). However, according to some scholars, this
unipolar era in transnational litigation has given way to greater multi-polarity. As the
relative popularity of non-U.S. forums grows, it is likely there will be a proliferation of
foreign judgments brought to the United States for recognition and enforcement—
along with the consequent challenges of determining foreign law. Id. at 37–38. See also
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481 (2011) (discussing and analyzing the data underpinning the assertion that U.S.
transnational litigation is decreasing in popularity).
141. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
142. See John B. Bellinger, III & R. Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourism: The Case for a
Federal Law on Foreign Judgment Recognition, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 521 (2014). It
may also be possible for a foreign plaintiff to seek to have a judgment recognized and
enforced in a jurisdiction where the defendant itself does not have assets, but a
subsidiary of the defendant does. For example, a recent Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation indicated that Ontario courts have
jurisdiction to recognize and enforce judgments against the assets of an uninvolved
subsidiary of a corporate defendant, providing that Ontario has jurisdiction over the
subsidiary, and that there is an “economically significant relationship” between the
subsidiary and the defendant. 2013 CanLII 758, para. 38 (Can. O.N.) appeal dismissed
3 S.C.R. 69, 72 (2015). In the U.S., according to the ALI, a judgment can be enforced
where the judgment debtor has assets or where they are subject to personal
jurisdiction. See A MERICAN LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 9(b) (2006).
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Traditionally, the United States has been perceived as
“relatively friendly to recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments.”143 However, there is no uniform federal law
governing this area. Instead, the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments is primarily governed by state law in both
state and federal courts.144 Courts recognize and enforce
foreign judgments on the following three bases: the 1962
Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act,145 the 2005
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition
Act,146 and common law principles if neither of the previous
statutes have been adopted.147
All three bases for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments stem from the comity doctrine,148 best defined in
Hilton v. Guyot as “the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts

143. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 596 (citations omitted); Ronald A. Brand,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, FED. JUD. CTR. 2 (2012).
144. The U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether
state or federal law governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
However, the consensus among state courts and lower federal courts is that state law
governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and federal courts will
apply the law of the state in which they sit. As an exception to this rule, federal law
will be applied in federal question cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS, supra note 128, at § 98 cmt. c.
145. At its height, the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act was
in force in over thirty states and the District of Columbia. Many of these states have
since repealed the Act in favor of more recent legislation. For the full text, see
UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENT RECOGNITION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS
ON
UNIF.
STATE
LAWS
1962)
[hereinafter
1962
Act],
https://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/UFMJRA.pdf. For a list of
states that at one point adopted this statute, see BRAND, supra note 109 at app. D.
146. The 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act is
largely based on the 1962 Act, but clarifies procedural and substantive issues, and
includes provisions relating to the burden of proof and statute of limitations. See
UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 2; 9 (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2005), [hereinafter 2005 Act],
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20money%20judgments
%20recognition/ufcmjra_final_05.pdf. At the time of writing, the 2005 Act was the
most widely recognized base for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
with eighteen states and the District of Columbia having adopted the statute in full or
in part. See S. I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S.
Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33:1 REV. LITIG. 45, 67 (2014).
147. The primary source of common law principles for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
(Am. Law Inst. 1987).
148. BRAND, supra note 143, at 3.
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of another nation.”149 Given the common origin of these bases
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is
unsurprising that they apply to a similar subset of foreign
judgments. That is, judgments that are “final, conclusive, and
enforceable” and “grant or deny a sum of money.”150
All three bases for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments outline a series of mandatory and discretionary
grounds for non-recognition with slight variances.151 In
general, mandatory grounds for non-recognition apply, where:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of
law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter.152
While a court must deny recognition if any of these three (or
in the case of the Restatement, two) grounds exist, a court may
deny recognition on other grounds as a matter of discretion. 153
Notably, there are a number of discretionary grounds for non-

149. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 158 (1895). According to Hilton v. Guyot,
comity requires the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments “where there
has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country
and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court,
or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it
full effect . . . .”
150. 2005 Act, supra note 146, at § 3 (a)(1)–(2); 1962 Act, supra note 145, at §§ 2–3;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 147, at § 481 (1).
151. Mandatory grounds for non-recognition render the judgment necessarily nonrecognizable and non-enforceable, while discretionary grounds allow courts to
interpret whether the circumstances of the specific case should make the judgment
non-recognizable and non-enforceable. See BRAND, supra note 143, at 13–20; 20–24.
152. See 2005 Act, supra note 146, at § 4(b)(1)–(3); 1962 Act supra note 145, at
§ 4(a)(1)–(3); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 147, at
§ 482 (1)(a)–(b). The 2005 Act states that these grounds render the judgment “nonrecognizable,” while the 1962 Act states that these grounds render the judgment “nonconclusive”—which in effect makes then non-recognizable. Note also, in the Third
Restatement Foreign Relations Law, no “jurisdiction over the subject matter” is a
discretionary ground as opposed to a mandatory one for non-recognition.
153. See Strong, supra note 146, at 70.
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recognition, including where:
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court
did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient
time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the claim for relief on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and
conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to
an agreement between the parties to otherwise
settle the dispute; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal
service, the foreign court was an inconvenient forum
for the trial of the action.154
Where mandatory grounds for non-recognition do not apply,
and where a discretionary basis for non-recognition does not
exist or is not invoked, a judgment is “enforceable in the same
manner as the judgment of a court of a sister state which is
entitled to full faith and credit.”155
The most common ground for non-recognition is lack of

154. See 2005 Act, supra note 146, at § 4(c)(1)–(6); 1962 Act, supra note 145, at §
4(b)(1)–(6); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 147, at §
482 (2)(a)–(f). The 2005 Act adds two additional discretionary grounds for nonrecognition to this list, where:
[T]he judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt
about the integrity of the court with respect to the judgment; or the specific
proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not compatible with
the requirements of due process of law.
155. 1962 Act, supra note 145, in Prefatory Note. According to the 2005 Act, a
judgment is “enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a judgment
rendered in this state.” Supra note 146, at § 7(2). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law also uses slightly different language, stating “a judgment entitled to
recognition . . . may be enforced by any party . . . in accordance with the procedure for
enforcement of judgments applicable where enforcement is sought.” supra note 147, at
§ 481(2). In addition (though not included in either Act or according to common law
principles), some states have passed legislation that makes ‘reciprocity’ an additional
requirement for enforcement. In other words, the foreign court must likewise recognize
and enforce judgments originating in the respective U.S. state or federal court.
Florida, Idaho, Maine, and North Carolina have made reciprocity a statutory
discretionary ground for recognition (no reciprocity a discretionary ground for nonrecognition), while Georgia and Massachusetts have made reciprocity a mandatory
ground for recognition (no reciprocity a mandatory ground for non-recognition). See
also Strong, supra 146, at 72.
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personal jurisdiction. 156 According to the 1962 Act, the 2005
Act, and common law principles, a foreign issuing court must
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the judgment
in question to be recognized and enforced in the United
States.157 While this requirement “appear[s] to consider the
issue solely from the perspective of the court rendering the
judgment in question,” U.S. courts often interpret this
requirement using the U.S. standard for due process, including
personal jurisdiction. 158
In the context of a judgment for climate change-related
damages, the U.S. standards for personal jurisdiction can only
be met if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the
foreign jurisdiction over which the issuing court presides. 159
These contacts must be such that a U.S. based greenhouse gas
producer “could reasonably expect to be hauled into court”160
without offending “traditional notions of fair play and
justice.”161
In a scenario where a U.S. court is considering whether a
U.S. defendant has general or specific contacts with the foreign
forum sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction, it is
unclear whether the production of greenhouse gas emissions
that cause climate damages only in combination with
emissions originating elsewhere would be sufficient to meet
the threshold test for “minimum contacts” established in
International Shoe and World Wide Volkswagen. In the case of
major U.S.-based greenhouse gas producers, it is reasonable to
156. See BRAND, supra note 143, at 17.
157. Strong, supra note 146, at 71. According to the 1962 Act and 2005 Act, there is
personal jurisdiction “in cases of personal service, voluntary appearance, prior consent
to jurisdiction of the foreign court, domicile, and commercial conduct.” Id. at 72; see
also id. at 17. The common law principles of personal jurisdiction are largely the same,
albeit slightly more complicated. Id. at 72; 1962 Act, supra note 145, at § 5(a); 2005
Act, supra note 146, at § 5(a).
158. Strong, supra note 146, at 72. This is particularly the case in states that adhere
to common law principles rather than the 1962 Act or 2005 Act. According to the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, “even if the rendering court had
jurisdiction under the laws of its own state, a court in the United States asked to
recognize a foreign judgment should scrutinize the basis for asserting
jurisdiction . . . .” Supra note 147, at § 482 cmt. c; see, e.g., Koster v. Automark Indus.
Inc., 640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981); Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds Inc., 436 A.2d 942
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
159. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
160. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
161. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
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assume they have operations and other connections worldwide,
strengthening the ties between the defendant and the foreign
jurisdiction, and the case for general or specific contacts.162
Even if a U.S. court does not ultimately recognize and
enforce a foreign judgment, many large greenhouse gas
producers operate in multiple countries. This means that the
judgment could conceivably be enforced in countries other than
the United States,163 including countries which have a more
relaxed approach to the requirements of personal
jurisdiction.164
As this Section demonstrates, transnational litigation
involves complex and inter-related questions about which
country’s courts should hear a climate damages case
(jurisdiction), which country’s laws should apply (choice of
law), and which countries could recognize and enforce a
judgment obtained in a foreign forum (recognition and
enforcement).
Based on an analysis of the United States’ current approach
to these questions, transnational climate damages litigation
could increase the likelihood of climate damages liability for a
U.S. greenhouse gas producer, simply by increasing the
number of jurisdictions where such claims could be brought,

162. The annual reports pursuant to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, completed by U.S. greenhouse gas producers as discussed in Section V,
demonstrate the significant overseas holdings and operations of these companies. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012). See, e.g., CHEVRON CORP.,
ANNUAL
REPORT
(FORM
10-K)
3–30,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000009341013000003/cvx123112x10kdoc.htm.
163. For example, in Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, an Ecuadorian court found Chevron
liable for environmental damages totaling $9.5 billion. See Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje,
2015 S.C.C. 42 at para 6, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69. Since the judgment was issued in 2011,
the plaintiffs seek to have the judgment recognized and enforced in foreign courts,
including in the U.S. and in Canada. See Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 376 F. Supp. 2d
334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). While the U.S. refused to recognize the judgment on the basis of
fraud, Canada’s Supreme Court recently found jurisdiction to hear the case, allowing
the plaintiffs to once again seek recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian
judgment. See Nicola Hong & Kim Mackrael, Canada’s Top Court Rules in Favor of
Ecuador Villagers in Chevron Case, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/canadas-top-court-rules-in-favor-of-ecuador-villagers-inchevron-case-1441384265.
164. GAGE, supra note 124, at 17–18 (outlining the more relaxed approaches to
personal jurisdiction found in other commonwealth countries, including the UK,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada). For information on how Australia addresses
personal jurisdiction in a more flexible manner, see Dickinson, supra note 124.
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the laws that could be applied, and countries where a
judgement could be recognized.
As Section V of this Article illustrates, transnational
litigation and, in particular, the possibility of the enforcement
of climate damages judgments in U.S. courts, could have
severe financial consequences for large U.S. greenhouse gas
producers.165 However, first, it is necessary to consider the
possibility that governments—either in the U.S. or abroad—
will introduce legislation facilitating climate damages
litigation.
IV. CLIMATE COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
To date, most attempts to assess the potential for climate
damages litigation have also assumed that liability will be
determined on the basis of current legal frameworks related to
liability, whether common law or statutory in nature.166
However, as this Section shows, governments often alter the
rules related to liability in response to new developments or
situations of perceived unfairness.
Many countries that are suffering from climate-related
impacts arguably have significant financial incentives for
reform that will only grow as these impacts, especially on
public expenditure, worsen.167 As public debate increasingly
focuses on damages and responsibility, public opinion may also
demand new climate compensation legislation to impose
liability on those responsible for large-scale greenhouse gas
emissions.
A.

Tobacco Damages Recovery Legislation and Other Laws

As noted above, links are often made between climate
damages litigation and tobacco damages litigation. Such
commentary generally emphasizes the ways in which common
law rules related to civil liability for tobacco have evolved. In
some jurisdictions, the introduction of legislation altering

165. See infra Section V, “Quantifying the Liability Risk of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Producers.”
166. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9; Zasloff, supra note 9; Penalver, supra note 9;
PEEL, supra note 30.
167. LYNDA COLLINS & HEATHER MCLEOD-KILMURRAY, THE CANADIAN LAW OF
TOXIC TORTS 291 (2014).
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common law bases for liability around tobacco claims was
central in clarifying or establishing the rules for civil liability
and clarifying approaches to causation.168
Notably, in 1995, Florida enacted the Medicaid Third Party
Liability Act,169 with British Columbia following suit in 1997,
and other Canadian provinces following suit shortly
thereafter.170 As Jacob Shelley explained, the Medicaid Act allowed the government to recover smoking-related costs covered
by Medicaid, and changed the rules for liability in lawsuits
against tobacco companies:
The Medicaid Third Party Liability Act represented a
significant development as it allowed the state to
introduce epidemiological evidence to prove causation,
created a new cause of action, removed affirmative
defences, and permitted the allocation of responsibility
on the basis of market share.171
Climate damages litigation appears ripe for this type of
development. Just as the tobacco compensation acts were
enacted in response to mounting scientific consensus that
tobacco was a cause of cancer172 and the increasing burden of
tobacco-related costs, the scientific consensus regarding
climate change is improving,173 costs are increasing,174 and
168. See Martin Olszynski et al., From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from
Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (April 24,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957921 (discussing the parallels between climate
and tobacco litigation, including the potential for climate compensation legislation
modeled on tobacco legislation).
169. Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1995).
170. Jacob J. Shelley, The Crown’s Right of Recovery Act, 18 HEALTH L. REV. 15, 16
(2010).
171. Id. at 17.
172. Notably, while the Surgeon General determined that tobacco was a cause of
cancer, they never stated that it was the cause of cancer. See Bruce A. Levin, The
Liability of Tobacco Companies—Should Their Ashes be Kicked?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 195,
223 (1987).
173. See Oreskes, supra note 7 (finding that of 928 article abstracts listed in the
Institute of Scientific Information database in 2004, 75 percent of the papers either
explicitly or implicitly accepted the consensus view of the IPCC Reports, and 25
percent took no position on the current anthropogenic climate change. Notably, none of
the papers opposed the consensus view).
174. See, e.g., Angela Lianovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit
Against the Auto and Oil Industry on the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 429, 431 (2005) (“Likewise, the petro industry has managed to
pass billions of dollars in environmental costs to the public, while successfully avoiding
common-law tort liability”).
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attention is shifting to who should be held responsible for the
resulting damages.175 As Lynda Collins and Heather McLeodKilmurray write,
Tobacco cost recovery statutes were enacted in response
to the enormous expenses caused by tobacco-related
illness. At a certain point governments (and
presumably citizens) realized that it was inappropriate
for the public purse to bear the burden of illnesses
caused by profit-centered commercial enterprise. It
seems highly likely that a similar thought process will
occur in the climate change context. As expenses
resulting from climate change mount (e.g. loss of roads
and buildings due to melting permafrost in the north,
flooding and other extreme weather events, personal
injury from heat waves, etc.), governments may well
feel the inclination – or indeed the necessity – to compel
large emitters to provide compensation. Although the
public nuisance model is theoretically available without
statutory reform, there is no doubt that the creation of
a statutory tort along the lines of the tobacco legislation
would substantially increase governments’ chances of
success in climate-related tort litigation.176
While the possible parallels between tobacco-related
litigation and climate damages litigation are well discussed,
tobacco damages recovery statutes are only one of many
examples of legislation that modifies the rules for liability. The
ability of the legislative branch to create, clarify, modify, or
limit rules of liability is well recognized, both in the United
States and in countries around the world.
In the environmental context, the rules for contaminated
sites liability defined by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA,
also known as the Superfund) is an example. Section 107 of
CERCLA makes most current and past owners (broadly
defined) of contaminated property liable to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for the costs of clean up, as
well as defines possible defenses and limits on that liability. 177
175. See id., for a more complete discussion of some of the notable parallels between
the development of tobacco legislation, leading ultimately to recovery, and the current
state of climate litigation broadly.
176. COLLINS, supra note 167, at 291.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012).
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Similarly, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 imposes strict liability
on parties that are “responsible” for oil spills, but also caps
that liability.178
Outside of environmental law, federal and state rules
governing questions that are fundamental to civil litigation
and procedure are often statutory in origin—for example,
legislation on limitation periods, joint and several liability, and
corporate structures. A host of other statutes also create,
modify, or limit rules of civil liability. Outside the United
States, there are many precedents for statutes that modify
civil liability rules. In civil law countries, liability regimes are
entirely statutory in nature.179 In common law countries,
legislation often alters the judge-made rules around liability,
causation, and the calculation of damages.180
Far from being remarkable or unusual, the legislative
branch has always played a crucial role in establishing rules of
liability in most, if not all, countries. Statutes related to
climate damages litigation could follow the path of
contaminated sites, oil spills, tobacco recovery, and other
similar statutes intended to clarify rules of liability while
addressing issues of broader public importance. Like
transnational litigation, development of such legislation could
lead to greenhouse gas producers being held liable for climate
change-related damages.
B.

What Might a Climate Compensation Act Look Like?

There is a lesson from the statutes explored in Section IV.A.,
for countries suffering climate impacts: if climate liability is
difficult or impossible to litigate under the current legal

178. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2012).
179. Civil law countries include much of continental Europe and their former
colonies, where governments have enacted “civil codes” outlining the rules governing
liability. In Germany, there are specific statutes outlining environmental liability
rules. See Umwelthaftungsgesetz [UmweltHG] [Environmental Liability Act], Dec. 10,
1990,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL
I]
at
2634,
§
1
(Ger.),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.ph
p?id=1396.
180. For example, and discussed above, Canadian provinces have introduced
legislation altering the rules around liability for the harm caused by tobacco. In
British Columbia, see Tobacco Damages Recovery Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 41 (Can.),
subsequently renamed the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act,
S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 (Can.).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol7/iss2/3

42

Byers et al.: The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation

306

WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

[Vol. 7:2

system, then change the law.181 Such legislation could vary
considerably from country to country, based on the underlying
approaches to liability. The following list, which includes some
of the goals a climate compensation act might accomplish, is
based on the ways that legislation has altered and clarified
liability in the past:182
 clarify who can sue for climate damages, and on what
basis (standing);183
 recognize or create legal rights or duties in respect of
the global atmosphere, or other rights that might
form alternative basis of liability;184
 clarify the type of evidence that may be used to
establish a causal link between particular weather
events and climate change;185
 adapt common law causes of action, or create new
causes of action, to address climate-related liability;186
 address questions about limitation periods and how
they apply to greenhouse gases emitted over long
periods of time; 187
181. See, e.g., Tyson Dyck, Features: A Civil Action, HAZMAT MANAGEMENT (Jun. 1,
2006), http://www.hazmatmag.com/features/a-civil-action/ (discussing how the
reasoning in the 2005 Supreme Court of Canada decision in British Columbia v.
Imperial Tobacco could help governments recover the public costs associated with
other industries, particularly those with high GHG emissions).
182. It is important to note that climate compensation acts could also have the
reverse effect of preventing governmental and non-governmental petitioners from
bringing claims against greenhouse gas producers. For example, legislation could be
enacted which prevents claims against greenhouse gas producers, providing they abide
by emission regulations.
183. See, e.g., Environmental Bill of Rights, S.O. 1993, c. 28 § 103 (Can.); Abatement
of Environmental Nuisances (Civil Action) Act, 5752–1992, p. 2 (Isr.) [hereinafter
AENCAA], as discussed in Lord, supra note 16, at 294. The AENCAA allows any
person (or NGO acting on behalf of a person) to take a civil action or class action in
cases of environmental pollution or nuisance.
184. See, e.g., National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 28 (S. Afr.)
(creating a duty of care to prevent or remediate pollution).
185. See, e.g., Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West
1995). A fairly common form of legislation dealing with issues of proof is a “reverse
onus clause,” which requires a defendant to disprove elements of a case once certain
elements are proven. See, e.g., Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-8 § 193 (Can.).
186. AENCAA, supra note 183, as discussed in Lord, supra note 16, at 294. There
are statutes that create or recognize legal rights and associated causes of action in
respect to environmental problems. See, e.g., UmweltHG, supra note 179 at 2634, § 1
(Ger.). This Act is discussed in Lord, supra note 16, at 413.
187. In general, limits on when court cases can be brought are statutory in nature.
However, there are also examples of these statutes being adjusted in situations where
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 define the remedies that a court might grant in a
climate litigation case, including how damages might
be apportioned between defendants;188
 provide for reciprocal enforcement of climate-related
judgments from countries that have similar climate
compensation legislation.189
In 2015, the Vanuatu Environmental Law Association and
West Coast Environmental Law released a report outlining
what a climate compensation act might look like.190 The report
provides a model act with commentary, setting out a legal
basis for common law claims by a variety of actors, including
individuals, against major greenhouse gas emitting
companies.191
C.

The Potential for Climate Compensation Acts

While there are no examples to date of a comprehensive
legal scheme aimed at addressing climate change liability,
there is current and proposed legislation that addresses the
civil liability of private corporations for climate change-related
losses.
Israel’s environmental laws include an early example of a
statutory regime that directly addresses civil liability and
injunctive relief related to climate change. Since 2008, these
laws have allowed a person who may be injured by “material
whose presence in the air causes or may cause . . . climate or
weather change” to apply to a court for an injunction.192 Two
more recent examples—originating in California and Kenya—

the time-delay is significant. See, e.g., Acts Amendment (Asbestos Related Diseases)
1983, (WA) s 4 (Austl.), amending Limitations Act 1935–1978 (WA) s 38 (Austl.).
188. See, e.g., Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 §§ 39–40
(Can.).
189. Some countries or jurisdictions have legislation setting out rules for the
enforcement of court orders from other countries, including designating the orders of
particular jurisdictions as generally enforceable. See, e.g., Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, 23 Geo. 5 c. 13 (Eng.).
190. GAGE, supra note 124.
191. GAGE, supra note 124.
192. I. Rosen-Zvi, Israel, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 16, at 294
(describing the effect of the Abatement of Environmental Nuisances (Civil Action) Act
and the Abatement of Environmental Nuisances Act, 1961 as amended by the Clean
Air Act, 2008). Id. at 294 (suggesting that claims for damages related to such an
injunction might be brought under the Class Action Act).
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suggest a new interest in legislation aimed at holding largescale industrial actors accountable for their contributions to
climate change.193
Starting in the United States, the Climate Science Truth
and Accountability Act is, at the time of writing, being debated
in the California Senate. The Climate Science Truth and
Accountability Act arises out of revelations that Exxon and
other fossil fuel companies knew, possibly as early as the
1960s, that fossil fuels were disrupting the global atmosphere,
and yet the companies spread and funded misinformation
campaigns, apparently to stifle public action on climate
change. As a result of these revelations, several state attorneys
generals have launched investigations into Exxon, with
consideration of possible proceedings under anti-trust laws. In
California, the Climate Science Truth and Accountability Act
amends the state’s limitation laws to prevent a fossil fuel giant
from claiming that any such proceedings are statute barred.
While not aimed at compensation for climate damages, the Act
represents a precedent for amending legislation to hold fossil
fuel companies accountable for climate-related activities that
are now viewed as tortious.
Kenya’s Climate Change Act (2014) is a comprehensive
climate change statute, which became law in May 2016. 194
Section 23 of the Act includes an important provision setting
out rules for civil liability and compensation for actions related
to climate change:
(1) A person may, pursuant to Article 70 of the
Constitution, apply to the Environment and Land
Court alleging that a person has acted in a manner
that has or is likely to adversely affect efforts
towards mitigation and adaptation to the effects of

193. Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act of 2014 is not included in this
list because it tackles regional transnational impacts of air pollution; however, it still
represents an important recent example of national liability rules being modified to
address transnational pollution impacts. Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (Act No.
24/2014) (Sing.). The Act creates a duty of entities to avoid contributing to the “haze
pollution in Singapore,” and makes a breach of that duty “actionable conduct at the
suit of any person in Singapore” who has suffered personal injury, property loss, or
economic loss as a result of the breach. Id. § 6. The Act also creates various
presumptions that would assist the plaintiff in such litigation. Id. § 8.
194. David Njagi, At Last, Kenya Signs Bill Into Climate Change, PAN-AFRICAN
MEDIA
ALLIANCE
FOR
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(May
6,
2016),
http://pamaccafrica.blogspot.ca/2016/05/finally-kenya-hassigns-bill-into.html.
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climate change.
(2) Where an application is made under sub-section (1),
the Court may make an order or give directions that
it considers appropriate to—
(a) prevent, stop or discontinue an act or omission that
is harmful to the environment;
(b) compel a public officer to take measures to prevent
or discontinue an act or omission that is harmful to
the environment; or
(c) provide compensation to a victim of a violation
relating to climate change duties.
(3) For the purposes of this section, an applicant does
not have to demonstrate that a person has incurred
loss or suffered injury.195
The Kenyan Climate Change Act represents the best
example of a statute addressing climate compensation since
the amendments to Israeli rules for injunctive relief in 2008. It
is worth noting that Kenya, even prior to this new law, had
been identified by Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide as a
jurisdiction in which there were legal bases for climate
damages claims.196 Also, Kenya’s new Act is reportedly the first
climate change law enacted in an African country, 197
suggesting that the Act could be used by other African
countries as a model.
A joint agreement, “People’s Declaration for Climate
Justice,” signed by six island nations in 2015, expresses the
desire of countries suffering from climate change to hold
accountable those seen as responsible for climate damages.
This agreement includes a sentiment that may give rise to
climate compensation statutes in the coming years:
We are from island states in shared oceans. We stand in
solidarity.
We commit to holding those most responsible for
climate change accountable. By doing so, we send a
message of hope that the people and not the polluters
are in charge of humanity’s destiny.
We commit to bring a case that would investigate the
195. Climate Change Act, No. 11 (2016) THE LAWS OF KENYA, Part IV § 23 (Kenya),
http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex//actview.xql?actid=No.%2011%20of%202016.
196. ENVTL. LAW ALL. WORLDWIDE, supra note 138.
197. Njagi, supra note 194.
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human rights implications of climate change and hold
the big carbon polluters accountable to appropriate
international bodies or processes. 198
If enacted, climate compensation legislation would have the
potential to significantly impact litigation among domestic
parties within the enacting states, as well as the potential to
significantly impact transnational litigation. In the context of
transnational litigation, foreign climate compensation acts
might be applied in—and greatly facilitate—cases brought in a
foreign court involving a foreign plaintiff and a U.S.
greenhouse gas producer. The plaintiff could then seek to have
any resulting judgment recognized and enforced in the United
States or any other country where the defendant has assets. As
is discussed in Section V, these potential outcomes could have
significant implications for U.S. greenhouse gas producers.
V.

QUANTIFYING THE LIABILITY RISK OF U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCERS

Should one or both of the potentialities regarding
transnational litigation and legislation alter the rules around
litigation and liability, the liability of U.S. greenhouse gas
producers could be staggering. For the sake of illustration, this
Section draws upon research by Richard Heede, quantifying
the contribution of ninety entities to historic greenhouse gas
emissions, and considers the potential liability of five oil, gas,
and coal companies currently trading on the New York Stock
Exchange: Chevron, ExxonMobil, Conoco Phillips, Peabody
Energy, and Consol Energy.199
A.

Methodology

Heede’s study quantifies the relative contribution of major
fossil fuel companies to global greenhouse gas emissions and
provides a starting point for estimating the potential liability
of U.S. companies for the costs and damages of climate change,
198. People’s Declaration for Climate Justice, GREENPEACE (June 8, 2015) (Phil.),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/climate/2015/P
eople%E2%80%99s%20Declaration%20for%20Climate%20Justice.pdf.
199. Fossil fuel producers, such as these companies, are attractive targets for
climate change lawsuits as they are “upstream defendants”: companies responsible not
only for their own emissions, but also for the emissions resulting from the proper use
of their products. See Zasloff, supra note 9, at 1861–63.
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both globally and in specific countries. 200 Heede’s figures
include estimates of both direct emissions (those created by the
company and its subsidiaries) and “downstream” emissions
(those produced by the oil, gas or coal when it is burned). 201
The aforementioned U.S. oil, gas, and coal companies
represent the top five U.S. greenhouse gas producing
companies on Heede’s list of “carbon majors” (and all five are
among the top ten investor-owned greenhouse gas producers
worldwide).202
To reach the liability figures below, each U.S. company’s
percentage of global emissions from 1751 to 2010 was
multiplied by the costs and damages of climate change as
provided in the 2012 Climate Vulnerability Forum/DARA
Report (DARA Report) funded by UNICEF, among others. 203
This report focuses on the socio-economic impact of global
emissions on individual nations, differentiating between the
costs and damages caused by climate change204 and the direct
200. Heede, supra note 86, at 229. See Richard Heede, Supplementary Materials:
Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and
Cement
Producers,
1854–2010,
6–9,
http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/Heede%20SupplementaryMaterials%20Nov1
3.pdf. The Supplementary Materials to Heede’s study divide the carbon majors into
investor-owned companies, state-owned companies, and nation states. As this Article
focuses on the potential liability of greenhouse gas producing companies, it
concentrates on Heede’s list of investor-owned “carbon majors,” which together
represent 21.7 percent of global emissions from 1751 to 2010. As examined in this
Section, the top five US greenhouse gas producing companies all fall within Heede’s
top ten investor-owned carbon majors and cumulatively represent 9.4 percent of global
emissions from 1751 to 2010. Id.
201. This raises questions about the relative legal responsibility of companies that
extract, process, and market fossil fuels relative to the end-user. However, case law
concerning MTBE fuel additives, tobacco, and other products demonstrates that courts
can and will find manufacturers of products that cause harm liable for the anticipated
use of their products. See e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D.
Fla. 2000); Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
202. Heede, supra note 86. “Carbon majors” refer to the ninety entities responsible
for 63 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions to date. These U.S. companies are
typical of others on Heede’s list of carbon majors in that their greenhouse gas
production began early in the 1900s, well before the impact of greenhouse gases on
climate change became well-established. This could suggest that the U.S. companies’
respective share of global emissions from 1990 to present—and consequent liability—
may be slightly lower than identified in Heede’s study.
203. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3.
204. The estimate for “climate change” encompasses the costs and damages associated with a global rise in temperature. Examples of the types of costs and damages of
climate change considered in the DARA Report include, but are not limited to: hunger;
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costs caused by the current “carbon economy.”205
The liability figures do not include the costs and damages
caused by U.S. companies’ contribution to the carbon economy
because these effects are largely localized. That is, unlike
climate impacts, where a U.S. contribution is proportionately
responsible for damage in other countries, the bulk of costs and
damages caused by U.S. companies through the carbon
economy will be borne in and by the United States.206
B.

Global Liability of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Producers

The DARA Report estimates the total costs and damages of
climate change and the carbon economy in 2010 as $1.2
trillion, or 1.7 percent of global GDP, rising to 3.2 percent of
global GDP by 2030.207 Using the information provided in the
report, the total annual costs and damages of climate change
alone in 2010 were nearly $700 billion.208 The figures in Table
1 below represent the annual contribution of the top five U.S.
greenhouse gas emitting producers to the global costs and
melting permafrost; drought, floods and landslides; loss of biodiversity and rising sea
levels; malaria and other vector borne diseases; and stresses on fishing, forestry,
tourism, and other industries. See CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note
3, at 63.
205. The estimate for the “carbon economy” focuses on the localized costs and
damages arising from the production and use of fossil fuels. The DARA Report
considers examples of the types of costs and damages of the carbon economy, including
but not limited to: costs and damages caused by oil extraction and oil spills, increased
risk of health issues associated with air pollution, and stresses on industries. See id.
206. Excluding the costs and damages of the carbon economy may result in
conservative liability estimates, as they include only one aspect of the damages and
costs caused by the U.S. companies.
207. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 17.
208. See CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 17. While the
Executive Summary does not provide a number for global GDP in 2010, it is possible to
estimate the global GDP as $70.6 trillion using the numbers provided (where 1.7
percent of global GDP is $1.2 trillion, global GDP is $1.2 trillion divided by 1.7 percent
or 0.017). Id. Accordingly, it is possible to estimate the 2010 costs and damages of
climate change alone (i.e. excluding costs from the carbon economy) as $705.8 billion
(where the costs and damages of climate change are an estimated 1.0 percent of GDP,
climate change costs and damages is global GDP multiplied by 0.01). Id. This estimate
of $705.8 billion is higher than the estimate of $609.0 billion, reached by totaling the
individual costs and damages of each climate vulnerability indicator. Id. at 23. Note
also that the original global GDP in 2010 estimate of $70.6 trillion, derived from the
numbers presented in the Executive Summary, is greater than the global GDP 2010
estimate by the World Bank of $63.0 trillion. World Development Indicators Database,
Gross
Domestic
Product
2010,
WORLD
BANK
4
(Jul.
1,
2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
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damages of climate change alone in 2010 and by 2030.209
Table 1210
GLOBAL LIABILITY OF U.S. COMPANIES
Entity

Percentage Market

Annual

Annual

of Global

Capitalization

contribution to

contribution to

Emissions

(2010 in 2010

the costs and

the costs and

damages of

damages of

climate change

climate change

(2010 in 2010

(2030 in 2010 U.S.

U.S. Dollars)

Dollars)

1751–2010

U.S.

Dollars) 211

Chevron

3.52%

$183.6 billion

$21.4 billion

$151.5 billion

Exxon

3.22%

$368.7 billion

$19.6 billion

$138.6 billion

1.16%

$100.1 billion

$7.1 billion

$49.9 billion

Mobil
Conoco
Phillips
Peabody

0.86%

-

$5.2 billion

$37.0 billion

0.63%

-

$3.8 billion

$27.1 billion

Energy
Consol
Energy

C.

Liability of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Producers in Developing
Countries

While the global liability of U.S. companies is significant,
recovery for the costs and damages of climate change through
litigation or legislation will develop in individual countries—
likely by those expected to suffer most from the impacts of
climate change, but receive little benefit from fossil fuels.
Vietnam, Ghana, and India fall into this category, as they are

209. I.e., excluding costs from the carbon economy. Each company’s “Percentage of
Global Emissions 1751–2010” is taken from Heede, supra note 86, at 229.
210. See Section V.A., “Methodology” (describing the methodology used to reach
these calculations).
211. Note that the market capitalization of each company in 2010 is included to
illustrate how significant liability is relative to capitalization. The liability estimates
relative to capitalization would conceivably be even greater if growth of these
companies were to slow, as it becomes clear that some of the proven reserves of the
companies cannot be gainfully exploited.
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historically considered to be “low emitters” in “acute” or
“severe” danger of significant losses from climate change.212
The figures in Table 2 below represent the contribution of the
top five U.S. greenhouse gas producers to the costs and
damages of climate change in these developing countries.213
1.

Vietnam

The DARA Report estimates the net costs and damages
caused by climate change in Vietnam in 2010 as approximately
$14.2 billion, 214 rising to $160.6 billion by 2030.215 As Table 2
illustrates, the top five U.S. greenhouse gas producers
contributed approximately $1.3 billion to these costs and
damages in 2010, and are expected to contribute $15.1 billion
per year by 2030.
2.

Ghana

The DARA Report estimates the net costs and damages
caused by climate change in Ghana in 2010 as approximately
$2.7 billion, 216 rising to $20.5 billion by 2030.217 As indicated in
212. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at 294–96.
213. While the DARA Report estimates the costs of climate change for each country
in terms of a percentage of GDP, it does not provide a dollar value of the losses in one
location. For the purposes of this report, country specific net costs are calculated by
totaling the costs for the country for each indicator assessed by the DARA Report.
Provided in the following footnotes are comparisons of the numbers achieved by
totaling the costs for the country for each indicator, and the numbers reached by
multiplying the costs of climate change as a percentage of GDP by actual GDP in 2010
and projected GDP in 2030. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3, at
294–96.
214. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation).
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Vietnam are estimated as
5.2 percent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2010. Id. at 296. The GDP for Vietnam in 2010 is
estimated as $280 billion 2010 PPP (purchasing power parity is an economic concept
used to determine the relative value of currency across countries). Id. at 219. Using
these numbers, the estimated costs and damages of climate change were $14.6 billion
in 2010 (which is slightly more than achieved by adding the various DARA Report
indicators for Vietnam).
215. According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Vietnam are
estimated as 10.7 percent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2030. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM &
DARA, supra note 3, at 296. The GDP for Vietnam in 2030 is estimated as $1.5 trillion
2030 PPP. Id. at 219. Using these numbers, the estimated costs and damages of
climate change would be $160.5 billion in 2030 (which is significantly more than that
achieved by adding the various DARA Report indicators for Vietnam).
216. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation).
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Ghana are estimated as 4.4
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Table 2, the contribution of the top five U.S. greenhouse gas
producers to the costs and damages of climate change totaled
$255.5 million in 2010, with this number projected to increase
to $1.9 billion per year by 2030.
3.

India

It is particularly relevant to examine the contribution of
U.S. companies to the costs and damages of climate change in
India, given the nation’s potentially favorable judicial
environment for climate change litigation.218 The DARA Report
estimates the net costs and damages caused by climate change
in India in 2010 as approximately $76.5 billion, 219 rising to
$613.6 billion by 2030.220 As shown in Table 2, the top five U.S.
greenhouse gas producers contributed approximately $7.2
billion to these costs and damages in 2010, and are expected to
contribute $57.6 billion per year by 2030.

percent of Ghana’s GDP in 2010. CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM & DARA, supra note 3,
at 296. The GDP for Ghana in 2010 is estimated as $65 billion 2010 PPP. Id. at 207.
Using these numbers, the estimated costs and damages of climate change were $2.7
billion in 2010 (which matches the estimated loss achieved by adding the various
climate vulnerability monitor indicators for Ghana).
217. Supra note 3, at 58 n. 212 (discussing the formula for this calculation).
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for Ghana are estimated as 8.9
percent of Ghana’s GDP in 2030. Id. at 296. The GDP for Ghana in 2030 is estimated
as $210 billion 2030 PPP. Id. at 207. Using these numbers, the estimated costs and
damages of climate change would be $18.7 billion in 2030 (which is slightly higher
than that achieved by adding the various climate vulnerability monitor indicators for
Ghana).
218. Some have singled out India as being a promising venue for climate damages
litigation due to the “potentially potent combination of the following: (i) well developed
law and activist judiciary; (ii) its status as a potentially serious ‘victim’ of climate
change; and (iii) at the same time its large population, economic power and growth
rate, and status as a ‘top ten’ (in cumulative terms) GHG emitter.” See CLIMATE
CHANGE LIABILITY, supra note 16, at 48.
219. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation).
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for India are estimated as 2.2
percent of India’s GDP in 2010. Id. at 294. The DARA Report does not provide an
estimated GDP for India in 2010.
220. Supra note 3, at 58 n.212 (discussing the formula for this calculation).
According to the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the losses for India are estimated as 4.3
percent of India’s GDP in 2030. Id. at 294. The DARA Report does not provide a
projected GDP for India in 2030.
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Table 2
LIABILITY OF U.S. COMPANIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
VIETNAM
Entity

Percentage of

Annual contribution

Annual contribution

Global

to the costs and

to the costs and

Emissions

damages of climate

damages of climate

1751–2010

change (2010 in 2010

change (2030 in 2010

U.S. Dollars)

U.S. Dollars)

3.52%

$501.5 million

$5.7 billion

Exxon Mobil 3.22%

$458.7 million

$5.2 billion

Conoco

1.16%

$165.3 million

$1.9 billion

0.86%

$122.5 million

$1.4 billion

0.63%

$89.7 million

$1.0 billion

Percentage of

Annual contribution

Annual contribution

Global

to the costs and

to the costs and

Emissions

damages of climate

damages of climate

1751–2010

change (2010 in 2010

change (2030 in 2010

U.S. Dollars)

U.S. Dollars)

3.52%

$95.8 million

$720.0 million

Exxon Mobil 3.22%

$87.6 million

$658.7 million

Conoco

1.16%

$31.6 million

$237.3 million

0.86%

$23.4 million

$175.9 million

0.63%

$17.1 million

$128.9 million

Chevron

Phillips
Peabody
Energy
Consol
Energy
GHANA
Entity

Chevron

Phillips
Peabody
Energy
Consol
Energy
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INDIA
Entity

Percentage of

Annual contribution

Annual contribution

Global

to the costs and

to the costs and

Emissions

damages of climate

damages of climate

1751–2010

change (2010 in 2010

change (2030 in 2010

U.S. Dollars)

U.S. Dollars)

3.52%

$2.7 billion

$21.6 billion

Exxon Mobil 3.22%

$2.5 billion

$19.8 billion

Conoco

1.16%

$887.1 million

$7.1 billion

0.86%

$657.6 million

$5.3 billion

0.63%

$481.8 million

$3.9 billion

Chevron

Phillips
Peabody
Energy
Consol
Energy

These figures represent the total contribution of U.S.
companies to climate change damages, globally and in specific
countries, and therefore the risk, not certainty, of liability; the
actual numbers could be lower or, conceivably, higher.
Even if courts around the world become increasingly willing
to award climate damages against fossil fuel companies, there
may be situations that prevent full recovery.221 The only way
that awards based purely on damages could even approach
these estimates would be if it became commonplace for governments to bring suits for all climate damages suffered by their
citizens and their country (encompassing a wide range of the
climate damages).222

221. For example, if the link between a company’s greenhouse gas emissions and
climate damages cannot be proven on the basis of a balance of probabilities, or where a
plaintiff is not in a position to engage in large-scale tort litigation, then there may not
be (full) recovery.
222. This type of litigation, known as parens patriae litigation, in which the
government acts in the role of a parent on behalf of the public, is well established in
the United States. See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S.
497, 518–28 (2007) (recognizing the ability of states as parens patriae to protect
natural resources or the health of citizens). The emergence of class actions for climate
damages might also represent a significant percentage of the damages discussed, but
would probably not include environmental and other public damages which could be
better captured in a parens patriae case.
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On the other hand, the calculations above do not reflect the
possibility of punitive awards, which is in addition to damages
for actual harm suffered, and intended to punish egregious
behavior. Such awards might be possible where companies
make little effort to move away from fossil fuels despite full
knowledge of the damage they cause, or where companies
actively undercut science establishing the connection between
emissions and climate change.223
Subject to these qualifications, this Article is a first attempt
at quantifying the considerable liabilities that at least five U.S.
companies might be incurring. Investors may wish to note that
the current stock valuations of Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Conoco
Phillips, Peabody Energy, and Consol Energy Inc., as well as
other companies responsible for high levels of greenhouse gas
production, do not take into account this risk of climate
damages litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article opened with a quotation by Bank of England
Governor Mark Carney, describing climate change as a
“Tragedy of the Horizon” that is bound to become a “defining
issue for [global] financial stability” in the coming decades. 224
While Carney identifies multiple channels through which
climate change will impact financial stability, the focus of this
Article has been the second: the liability risks presented by
climate damages litigation.
Two previously overlooked potentialities—the emergence of
223. The Guardian recently reported that ExxonMobil was aware of the connection
between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change as early as 1981. See Suzanne
Goldenberg, Exxon Knew of Climate Change in 1981, Email Says – but it Funded
Deniers
for
27
More
Years,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Jul.
8,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/08/exxon-climate-change-1981climate-denier-funding. According to Greenpeace, ExxonMobil has since spent over $30
million on think-tanks and research promoting climate change denial. Id. In Canada, a
Quebec superior court recently ordered three major cigarette companies to pay $15
billion to smokers, with the plaintiffs arguing that the companies were aware of the
health concerns and profited from the addictive quality of cigarettes. See Létourneau
v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2015 QCCS 2382, 10 J.E. 2015-1024 (Can.). For a discussion
of the parallels between potential legislation altering the liability rules around climate
change and those around tobacco legislation in Canada (such as those found in
Quebec), see GAGE, supra note 124 and see GAGE & BYERS, supra note 138 at 34–37.
Note also that the figures do not reflect the considerable legal costs that would be
incurred by companies defending themselves against such lawsuits.
224. Carney, supra note 1, at 1.
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transnational climate damages litigation, including the
possible enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts; and
the enactment of climate compensation legislation—have the
ability to shift the current climate damages litigation
landscape well within the decades forecasted by Carney.
Section V of this Article calculates the substantial “climate
liabilities” held by the top five U.S. greenhouse gas producers,
if and when parties who have suffered climate damages
succeed in recovering compensation. The liability of the top
global greenhouse gas producers would be staggering, with far
reaching consequences for their corporate survival. Investors
will wish to inform themselves of these risks; money managers,
for their part, have a legal duty to do so.225

225. See Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the
Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate
Change, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. & STAN. J. INT’L L. 251, 271 (2007) (“Failing to take
into account climate change through fund risk management practices could be deemed
a breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, if the investment goals of the pension plan (or
foundation or charitable trust) include environmental health or sustainability criteria,
the fiduciaries must make certain that their investment-related decisions further
environmental health or sustainability”).
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